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Abstract 
Between 2002 and 2005, Lufthansa, Swiss and KLM in cooperation with Pri-
vatAir, start-up airlines Eos and MAXjet individually, launched scheduled business 
class-only services between Europe and the US. This paper qualitatively analyses the 
new business model from the strategic and operational point of view. Different ap-
proaches based on pull or push motivation have been identified and the characteristics 
of the service offerings extensively examined. From the strategic aspect, the analysis 
has proven that the products have an inherent value benefit for the respective target 
group. It has been established that short and ultra-long haul routes are not viable for the 
business model. The main shortcoming of the offering is the lack of connectivity as op-
posed to network carriers, resulting in dependency on the local demand. For the start-up 
airlines, establishment of market presence and goodwill is critical. In the area of operat-
ing economics, pilot crew and navigation charges have a higher impact than in the 
mixed class operation. Airport charges and administrative overhead build a larger por-
tion of total expenses in case of traditional airline services. No significant evidence 
against the viability of the premium airline model could be found. 
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1. Introduction 
When Lufthansa introduced business class-only flights from Düsseldorf to New 
York - Newark in June 2002 it was quite a revolutionary move. But was it so revolu-
tionary? In the history of modern aviation, there have been similar milestones. In 1984, 
Virgin Atlantic challenged the industry by eliminating the first class service, which for 
the contemporary network airlines used to be a cost, rather than a revenue generator. 
The airline channeled the costs saved by cutting the first-class into a whole new level of 
service for the business-class passengers (Kim and Mauborgne 1997). 
The same can be said about flying a big airliner with two or even three classes of 
travel from an industrial conurbation such as the Ruhrgebiet, north of the city of 
Düsseldorf, that generates sufficient business traffic but the economy compartment suf-
fers from low load factors. If an airline wants to make money on such route, it needs to 
cut off the back part of the plane and commit the plane wholly to those who are paying 
for it. After all, they are paying enough. Small and start-up airlines face a similar type of 
reality. As research studies on small companies suggest, only those firms that are highly 
specialized1 survive in today's volatile market (Sandvig and Coakley 1998). The idea 
behind this is relatively simple – a small firm will neither have sufficient specialists, nor 
the expertise or resources to be a generalist, i.e. to provide satisfactory service to multi-
ple customer segments. This is particularly true for smaller airlines that compete in lib-
eralized, competitive markets. If a small airline tries to compete against a network car-
rier in a specific market or route and also tries to serve all customer segments that the 
established airline is serving, the network carrier is going to beat both their quality and 
their price. The large extent of the incumbent's operations provides economies of scale 
and creates opportunities for leveraging expertise throughout the firm on a scope that 
cannot be matched by a small competitor. However, small players can break into the 
market by the means of specialization. By focusing on a particular target group and 
committing themselves to providing a better value to a particular market segment, the 
better value can in fact be achieved and provide a sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
                                                 
1 or bring their core competency to a new market 
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Let us look back at the Virgin Atlantic example. Virgin was a small airline at the 
time of their start-up, but it managed to position itself by providing some very special 
service to the business segment. In Virgin's "Upper Class",  business travelers receive 
specialty services such as hand massages, express pick-up on motorbikes, showers and 
clothes pressing in the lounges after arrival and other amenities that would be catego-
rized as eccentric when first introduced. British Airways to this day could or did not 
want to match some of the Virgin amenities. Partly due to the enormous costs the up-
grade of their services would cause (because of the larger scale of British Airways' op-
erations) or because these service elements would not be a good fit with their corporate 
values which are rather conservative, as opposed to the youthful, dynamic Virgin. It 
needs to be kept in mind that a network carrier has a need for standardization – a certain 
level thereof is expected by the passengers – and a service upgrade at say the transatlan-
tic route sooner or later needs to lead to an upgrade on other routes as well. A specific 
quality of service is one component of every airline's brand. Stark differences of quality 
within the same product range such as the "Business Class" would definitely drive down 
the value of the "Business Class" brand product. Since substantial standards upgrades 
are costly to copy for the competitor with large scale of operations, specializing in pro-
viding a unique business class-only product seems to be a good source of competitive 
advantage for a start-up airline. However, this advantage comes with certain conditions. 
First, that the service truly contains some premium or value added component when 
compared to the incumbent's/competitor's product.  Second, this value has to be costly 
to imitate on a large scale. The Virgin Atlantic approach applied to the premium airline 
framework seems to be the best direction. It is possible that starting a premium business 
airline today is probably a better idea than starting a low cost carrier. The competition in 
the business class segment is surely as hard as it is in the lower end of the market, but 
for the competitor it is cheaper to increase the density of the seating and reduce some 
amenities than to upgrade the aircraft interior and especially, invest into the develop-
ment of more sophisticated services.  
Surely, the level of service has to respect the limitation of the market at the other 
end. Offering exorbitant luxury will most likely prevent competitors from imitating it, 
but it might also drive prices to levels that narrow the potential group of customers to a 
minimum or where sharing a private jet becomes an option. Or, the high costs of the 
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service cannot be recovered at a price that would be accepted by the market. None of 
the options are attractive, which airline history has demonstrated; lessons can be learned 
from the examples of Concorde, Regent Air and MGM Grand Air, the predecessors of 
the single class premium airline model. 
A differentiation strategy, i.e. serving multiple customer segments would for a 
small airline most likely result in insufficient load factors in one or more compartments 
of the plane. Having just one compartment with mediocre load factors can destroy the 
whole economics of an airline with a small scope of operations. Only network carriers 
have the capacities to pursue a differentiation strategy. Some opinions suggest that the 
differentiation could go even further than today and that four classes of service are go-
ing to be the next step, as is already reality with a few airlines (Shaw 1999:123). Never-
theless, small new entrants only have the option of focusing on a specific customer seg-
ment and serving it superbly. 
 
This paper was inspired by the emergence of a new type of airline service, here-
inafter referred to as the "premium airline model", first pioneered by Lufthansa in coop-
eration with PrivatAir in 2002 and followed by numerous other established airlines or 
new entrants adopting the principle. The approach with some variations was also repli-
cated on the traditional London – New York route by the start-up airlines Eos and 
MAXjet. In all cases, the service is characterized by the long haul characteristics of the 
route, use of a single space cabin featuring business class standard and is primarily tar-
geted towards business clientele. Like the no-frills model at the low end of the service 
scale, the premium model also has specific characteristics that are meant to be explored 
by this paper, since no evidence has been found that this has been done yet either by the 
academic community or other institutions. In particular, the viability of the business 
model shall be examined from the strategic considerations as well as the operating char-
acteristics viewpoint. In detail, the following issues are addressed: 
 
1. What are the characteristic features of the current business class-only 
products? 
 (Chapter 2 – Premium Airline Model – Status Quo and Characteristics) 
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2. Is the existence of the premium airline model justified – e.g. by a pres-
ence of corresponding demand, provision of added or better value? 
 (Chapter 3 – Justifications for the Existence of the Premium Airline 
Business Model) 
 
3. What is the difference between the premium and traditional mixed-class 
model in terms of operating economics? 
 (Chapter 4 – Operating Economics) 
 
The option of analyzing the premium model from the short-haul perspective was 
also considered, but abandoned. The reason being is the rapid decline in the short-haul 
business class market due to cost pressure in companies that see the significantly higher 
prices for short haul flights as not justifiable. Results of a research survey (Exhibit 1) 
that was conducted among 20 major European companies have revealed that the allow-
ance for business class on short-haul flights is significantly lower then for long-haul 
trips (Mason 2002), making the short-haul business class market unattractive for air-
lines. This has lead to the reduction of quality of the short haul business class service 
that can be subsumed under the term "Adjustable Curtain Strategy" (Ringbom and Shy 
2002) or even full elimination of business class on short haul sectors – an approach cho-
sen for instance by Aer Lingus (BTE 2006) – as opposed to quality improvements such 
as the flat bed seat in the long haul business class (Michaels 2005). 
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Exhibit 1 – Comparison of short and long haul travel allowance, includes travel manager (TM) and 
traveler views, in % of responses (Mason 2002) 
 
  5  
Another option that was considered was the treatment of private jet ownership, 
especially fractional ownership or jet cards as a competitor to the premium airline 
model. However, this option was also abandoned because of the following facts: the 
share of long range jets is barely over 15% of the total number of jets in service (Rolls 
Royce in HSH Nordbank 2005) and the vast majority of these belongs to corporations; 
the focus of the jet sharing and jet card concept being on short and medium haul. The 
cost of sending a single employee or a small group on a long haul trip using a private jet 
is multiple times higher than having them travel by a scheduled service2. This puts the 
private jet travel in the segment of first class or higher and it is hence not treated as a 
competitor to business class airline services. Nevertheless, the jet sharing concept can 
be seen as a complementary product as offered for instance by Lufthansa in Europe – 
the passenger travels business or first class on the long haul leg of the route and 
switches to a private jet for the shorter continental leg of the trip (Lufthansa Private Jet 
2006). 
 
 
                                                 
2 I.e. a 5-year 1/8 fraction (equalling 100 annual hours) in a Falcon 2000EX (entry level jet in the segment 
of transatlantic range jets) is offered by NetJets (NetJets 2006) at a cost of $3.283 million. The monthly 
management fee (indirect operating expenses) is $24,638 and the occupied hourly fee (direct operating 
expenses) $2,792. That translates into an effective hourly rate of $11,410. A London-New York round 
trip (2*~7 hours) would hence incur roughly $160,000 expense – which equals about $32,000 per passen-
ger if occupied by 5. This number would certainly decrease with the acquisition of a larger fraction; how-
ever, it would still be significantly above first class fare, notwithstanding the necessity to find multiple 
business executives needing to travel at the same time. 
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2. Premium Airline Model – Status Quo and Characteristics 
2.1 Predecessors 
The history of commercial aviation has been full of examples of luxury in the 
skies. In fact, the act of flying itself had for a long time been considered a luxury. When 
tracing back the origins of the premium airline model, one could go as far as the very 
beginnings of transatlantic aviation. The trips on Zeppelins and Hindenburgs and later 
Boeing Stratocruisers were acts of expressing one's (family's) status, a social event un-
derlining the exclusive nature of the trip. After World War II the availability of jet en-
gines and the new generation of airplanes based upon these turned intercontinental fly-
ing into commodity. The only factor determining the different fares that passengers 
were paying was the quality of service. This was the time when the standard three (or 
two) class layout that we know today had developed. At this stage, there were seem-
ingly not so many possibilities left for improving the business or first class passengers' 
satisfaction apart from two measures – significantly higher speed and a single class lay-
out. Both were addressed by Concorde, a joint project of BAC and British Airways 
(BOAC at that time) on the British side and Aérospatiale and Air France on the French 
side. 
As the reader may know, the Concorde, entering service in 1976, was the first 
and only commercial supersonic transport to fly a scheduled passenger service on a sig-
nificant scale. Obviously, the fact that the Concorde was supersonic had overshadowed 
one more important landmark in the aviation history – it was also the first modern pre-
mium airline business model and featured a single class cabin layout. Moreover, Con-
corde stayed in service longer than any business airline start-up to that point. Obviously, 
we would have some problems approximating the economics of a Concorde operation 
to that of a subsonic counterpart such as Eos Airlines and it should be omitted at this 
place. A direct comparison to say, Eos Airlines, or any premium-class-only operation is 
not possible because neither British Airways nor Air France have ever issued any usable 
financial data about Concorde's operation. Also, we cannot precisely determine what 
portion of customers utilized the Concorde because of its speed or for other reasons that 
might be common with the premium model (business / high society ambience) (Trott-
man 2000). However, it is probably safe to say that the Concorde had revealed the exis-
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tence of a distinct market segment – executive and other high-yield travelers demanding 
speed, exclusivity and efficient ground services.  
 
The idea of providing dedicated service to high-revenue passengers had also 
been tried in the United States (Table 1). However, these trials bear little resemblance to 
their contemporary counterparts. Two of them worth mentioning are Regent Air (1982-
1986, Los Angeles - Newark) and MGM Grand Air (1987-1994, Los Angeles and Las 
Vegas – New York, JFK). These airlines primarily targeted individuals from the show-
business or rich clientele making a few days' trip to Las Vegas or Los Angeles. Both 
airlines had to close down their operations after a few years of existence and none of 
them had shown profit. Their lack of success can be attributed to the following factors 
(Wall Street Journal 1985, New York Times 1985, Wolfe 1995, Travel weekly 1987, 
Latham 1989, Airline Industry Information 2002, Patterson 2003): 
 
- Lack of financing and lack of profitability resulting in further financial problems 
leading to conflicts with and action by the regulator 
- Weak schedule (twice / four times a day) that offered little flexibility to custom-
ers; other airlines combined offered several dozens of flights per day on the 
same routes 
- Fares were ranging between what would be equivalent to $3.000 (MGM) and 
$6.000 (Regent) in current prices for a round-trip. Especially in case of MGM, 
the price seems to be not high enough to have covered operating costs 
- For the target high profile clientele, renting or owning a private jet is a substitute 
that provides substantially better flexibility 
- Interior design in case of MGM Grand Air (Exhibit 2) is prohibitive to reaching 
break-even load factors – it is improbable that a required amount of seats at the 
given layout can be sold 
- Not the most efficient aircraft (Boeing 727, Douglas DC-8) used – (during the 
2nd oil crisis); additionally, due to obsolescence the Douglas aircraft had issues 
with complying to noise regulations  
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 MGM Grand Air Regent Air Concorde 
BA/AF 
Period 1987-1994 1983-1986 1976-2000, 
2001-2003 
Routes LAX-JFK, LAS-JFK LAX - EWR LHR-JFK 
LHR-IAD 
CDG-JFK 
CDG-IAD 
and other 
Clientele High-profile: actors, 
sport-stars, politi-
cians 
Business ex-
ecutives and 
high-profile 
Business ex-
ecutives and 
high-profile 
Aircraft Boeing 727, Doug-
las DC-8 
Boeing 727-
100 
Concorde 
Seats 33 34 100/92 
Price $1,000 one way 
(~ $1,500 in current 
prices) 
$1620 one way 
(three times the 
conventional 
first class,  
~$3350 in cur-
rent prices) 
$12,725 round 
trip 
   Table 1 - Premium Airline Predecessors, compiled by the author (New  
   York Times 1985, Travel Weekly 1987, Latham 1989, Airline Industry  
   Information 2002, Patterson 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2 – MGM Grand Air cabin layout (top), Concorde cabin layout (single class British Airways 
version, bottom) 
Images courtesy of www.airchive.com and www.concordesst.com 
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2.2 Status Quo 
From the service level aspect, the premium airline product fits into the category 
of long-haul business class services. In contrast to traditional mixed class service where 
the cabin is subdivided into different classes of service (economy, business and fre-
quently also premium economy and first class), the premium airline model cabin is de-
signed as a single business class and all passengers receive the same level of premium 
service. To a larger or lesser extent, the premium airline service shares all features typi-
cal to a modern business class offering such as business class legroom (55-80 inch), 
reclinable seats (some into full flat beds), several course menu and wine selection on 
board, state-of-the-art in-flight entertainment (IFE), airport lounge access before and 
after flight, and potentially limousine, escort and concierge service. With the exception 
of Eos Airlines, the cabin layout (Exhibit 3) corresponds with common business class 
standards and will thus not be separately treated as such. 
 
   
Exhibit 3 – Cabin views – 1) Lufthansa/PrivatAir  2) MAXjet  3) Eos Airlines (pictures taken from 
corporate websites) 
 
1 2 
3
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Aircraft chosen for this operation are either narrow-body airliners with extended 
range such as Airbus A319LR (Airbus Corporate Jet), Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) or 
Being 757 or mid-size wide-body aircraft such as Boeing 767-200. The cabins accom-
modate between 50 and 100 passengers in business class standard, in contrast to cabins 
of the same size that would accommodate 150-300 if they were in economy class con-
figuration. 
The target customer group is usually well defined, even at the level of specific 
industries, e.g. automotive, oil and gas, financial services (pull motivation; Baloglu and 
Muzaffer 1996, Olver and Farris 1989) or the general "value-driven business traveler" 
(push motivation). Roughly, two types of routes can be identified; they correlate with 
the concrete type of target group: 
 
1) A thin route, later referred to as the "Whole-Small-Pie Route", established and 
served exclusively by the premium airline service, motivated by a specific, existing de-
mand (pull). 
2) A well-established route, later referred to as "Small-Portion-of-a-Large-Pie 
Route" already being profitably served by multiple carriers, with the premium airline 
being a new entrant (push). 
 
The positioning of the service also correlates with the type of route and the tar-
get group – traditional business class positioning can be found in the first type of route, 
a "value business class" positioning is supposed to create the demand in the latter case. 
The interplay among the type of route, target group and choice of aircraft will be ana-
lyzed in more detail later in this chapter. In order to provide a reality based background, 
the status quo of the current premium airline services will be outlined. 
 
Currently, five airlines offer services that can be described as single premium 
class products: Lufthansa, Swiss, KLM and the US-based Eos Airlines and MAXjet 
Airways (Table 2). The first three airlines contract the service from PrivatAir, a Swiss 
operator specializing in luxury private charters and recently becoming successful as an 
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outsourcer of premium airline operations. Another new entrant in the segment, UK-
based Silverjet, has announced launch of its services for January 20073. 
 
Airline Operated by Routes Launch
Lufthansa PrivatAir
Düsseldorf - New York (Newark), Düsseldorf - 
Chicago, Müchen - New York (Newark) June 2002
Swiss PrivatAir Zürich - New York (Newark) January 2005
KLM PrivatAir Amsterdam - Houston/Texas October 2005
Eos Airlines Own operation New York - London (Stansted) October 2005
MAXjet Airways Own operation
New York - London (Stansted), Washington, DC - 
London, Las Vegas - London November 2005
Silverjet Own operation London (Luton) - New York (Newark)
January 2007 
(announced)  
Table 2 – Current Premium Airline Operations 
 
Currently, the premium airline service is exclusively transatlantic. The time 
zone-shift is responsible for the schedules being very similar; the flights in question 
typically depart westbound from Europe in the morning, land in the United States in 
mid-afternoon, and take off eastbound for an overnight flight with a morning landing in 
Europe. The east-west geographic separation and the distance between Europe and 
North America are beneficial because they enable high aircraft utilization. Airborne 
times of 15 hours and more a day can be achieved. Newer aircraft with high dispatch 
reliability are typically utilized 6 days a week, making for a schedule convenient to a 
business traveler and allowing for a day of maintenance per week. The start-up opera-
tors Eos and MAXjet typically keep one reserve aircraft on the ground. Selected flights 
and their characteristics are shown in Table 3. 
                                                 
3 Air France has been offering a similar type of product under the brand "Air France Dedicate", utilizing 
Airbus A319-100 ER for scheduled flights to remote areas in Africa (Congo, Equatorial Guinea), Middle 
East (Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) and Central Asia (Uzbekistan). The target groups are "professionals 
[in oil and gas industry] travelling to construction projects, production sites and other major areas of eco-
nomic activity" (Air France 2006). However, the cabin is divided into business class and economy class – 
economy taking a larger part of the plane, which excludes the product from the definition of single class 
premium airline services and will thus not be analyzed in this paper. 
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Operator 
Lufthansa 
(GER) 
operated by 
PrivatAir 
Lufthansa 
(GER) 
operated by 
PrivatAir 
Lufthansa 
(GER)  
operated by 
PrivatAir 
Swiss 
(CH) 
operated 
by Pri-
vatAir 
KLM 
(NL) 
operated 
by Pri-
vatAir 
EOS 
Airlines 
(US) 
MAXjet 
Airways 
(US) 
Silverjet 
(UK) 
Route 
Düssel-
dorf-
Newark 
Düssel-
dorf-
Chicago 
Munich-
Newark 
Zürich-
Newark 
Amster-
dam -
Houston 
AMS-IAH 
New 
York - 
London 
JFK-STN 
New York 
London 
JFK-STN 
LTN-EWR 
Days per 
week 
7 5 (X36) 6 (X6) 6 (X6) 6 7 6 (X6) 7 
Primary 
Clientele 
n/a n/a Pharma-
ceutical 
Bank 
sector 
Oil sector Value 
driven 
financial, 
business 
Value 
driven 
business 
Value 
driven 
business 
Aircraft 
Type 
A319 LR A319 LR BBJ BBJ2 BBJ 
B757-
200 
B767-
238ER 
B767-
200ER 
Seats 48 48 48 56 44 48 102 100 
Pitch 58 58 55 60 62 78 60 75 
Frequent 
flyer 
Star Alli-
ance 
Star Alli-
ance 
Star Alli-
ance 
Star 
Alliance 
Sky Team 
Own, 
Club 48 
Own, 
MAXflier 
n/a 
Round-
trip 
~ $4,000 ~ $4,000 ~ $4,000 ~ $5,000 ~ $5,000 
$5,000-
6,500 
$2,000-
4,000 
~ $2,000 
(launch) 
Launch June 2002 June 2003 May 2003 
January 
2005 
October 
2005 
October 
2005 
November 
2005 
January 
2007 
Table 3 – Selected premium airline routes (compiled by the author from corporate websites) 
 
2.3 Route 
The bottom-line of an airline, as of any other business, is achieved by matching 
demand and supply. Airlines have little influence over the demand, but they can score 
by supplying quantity and quality that corresponds with the demand (Doganis 2002:6). 
This can be reached by serving a route where a certain demand is present with suitable 
aircraft. This is one part of the equation. The other part is that the unit revenues have to 
exceed unit costs (Doganis 2002:8). On routes with lower level of competition, e.g. the 
Düsseldorf-Chicago route, premium pricing in conjunction with sophisticated yield 
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management can be applied to maximize revenue. On highly competitive routes, such as 
London-New York, the price is determined externally. Since routes with little competi-
tion are becoming seldom and attract new entrants, airlines have focused their efforts on 
maintaining control over the costs by shaping the offer in a fashion that it matches the 
demand. This chapter focuses on the critical components of the premium airline product 
– the choice of aircraft and route – which is the basis for future financial performance. 
Once the route and the aircraft have been chosen, the airline will have little influence 
over cost blocks such as crew salaries, fuel, maintenance costs and aircraft related 
ground services. Fundamentally, the type of aircraft is primarily a function of the route, 
apart from the requirements resulting from the desired level of service. Hence, we will 
first look at the route characteristics and consequently identify the appropriate aircraft 
types. From the observation of the premium airline market development, we can iden-
tify two types of routes: 
 
1) "Whole-Small-Pie Route" (Pull Motivation) is a newly established route 
originating and terminating in areas with matching industry clusters and at least one 
endpoint rather unattractive for tourism. Hence, there is minimum demand for leisure 
travel, but a well-defined demand for business travel. Before the establishment of the 
route the demand had been satisfied by routing the business travelers into major hubs 
via feeding flights. It can be assumed that the information about the demand is quite 
readily available through a Global Distribution System's (GDS) statistics of transfers. 
To a certain extent the expected demand will be higher than the indication by the GDS 
data because of non-interlining feeding airlines and a certain portion of travelers using 
ground transportation to the hub. Also, fresh demand can be stimulated by the conven-
ience of the new route and the demographic impact of the new service. The demand is 
usually not large enough to attract further new entrants; hence the first mover has the 
advantage of "eating the whole small pie". An example of such routes would be Düssel-
dorf-Chicago with the main body of passengers coming from management in the auto-
motive and manufacturing industry and Amsterdam-Houston with a significant share of 
business travelers from the oil and gas industry. 
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2) "Small-Portion-of-a-Large-Pie Route" (Push Motivation) is an established 
major route with enough leisure and business travel to support multiple flights a day 
offered by multiple carriers. The route is characterized by strong competition but due to 
large passenger volumes it still attracts new entrants. These hope to take away some of 
the market share of the incumbents by offering a business product that is different from 
the established airlines. Possibly, the route is also characterized by growing passenger 
volumes which gives room to new entrants. A typical example of such route would be 
the London-New York route (NATS 2006). 
 
As can be seen from the characteristics of the routes and previous discussion of 
the decline in the short-haul business class, the routes suitable for the business model 
are exclusively those of long-haul nature (for possible resolution of long-haul, medium-
haul and short-haul see AEA 2006:3). It is thinkable that medium-haul routes such as 
from Europe to the Middle East would still fall into the category; predictors being the 
growth in the region as well as upgrades in the quality of existing business class prod-
ucts (Curley 2006). Regarding the viability of the model on ultra-long haul routes, i.e. 
over ~10 hours, the phenomenon of decreasing passenger volumes with increasing sec-
tor length needs to be examined. 
It can be established that there is generally more exchange of goods and persons 
on short, medium and long distance than on ultra-long distance. One can illustrate the 
trend on the example of Germany. Passenger exchange with economies at a similar 
stage of development and of comparable dimension falls significantly as the geographi-
cal separation increases above roughly 10.000 km (Table 4). Whereas the exchange be-
tween Germany and its counterparts within the 10.000 km circle is rather high (France – 
4.2, UK – 9.1, US – 6.4 million passengers in 2004), the passenger numbers for econo-
mies outside this circle are very low (Japan – 0.7, Hong-Kong4 – 0.3, Australia and 
Oceania – 0.6 million). Also, it is important to note that the level economic exchange 
decreases proportionally with the growing distance, implying a similar downfall in 
business travel. At the same time, there is always a significant share of leisure / visiting-
friends-and-family travelers on most of these routes. Hence, the use of mixed class ap-
                                                 
4 Hong Kong has a population of only about 7 million, but represents a trading spot for a much larger, 
international catchment area 
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proach is a logical consequence. These thin routes are already being served by network 
carriers who use their extensive networks to feed the passengers into hubs. Based on 
these observations (and the fact that narrow-body aircraft are not suitable for ultra long-
haul operation – see chapter 2.4 Type of Aircraft), it is safe to say that the premium air-
line model is not viable on ultra long-haul routes. 
 
 France Italy 
United 
Kingdom USA 
Hong-
Kong Japan 
Austr.& 
Oceania
Air Travelers (m) 4.2 6.6 9.1 6.4 0.3 0.7 0.6 
Imports from (m€) 54,627 35,589 39,414 41,342 1,994 21,435 1,263 
Exports to (m€) 79,871 54,374 61,681 69,311 4,093 13,330 5,040 
Imports + Exports (m€) 134,498 89,963 101,095 110,653 6,087 34,765 6,303 
Table 4 – Passenger and economic exchange statistics of Germany in 2004. Compiled by the author 
from Deutscher Verkehrs-Verlag 2005:196-197, Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden 2006 
 
2.4 Type of Aircraft 
The choice of the right aircraft is a crucial decision and has to reflect the follow-
ing aspects: 
 
• Expected passenger volumes (size) 
• Route on which the aircraft is going to be operated (range) 
• Favorable operating costs 
• Suitability of the type or the type family for future routes 
 
As discussed above, a typical premium airline route will be supporting aircraft 
capable of carrying between 50 and 100 passengers in business class configuration and 
the required range will in most cases be between 4.000 km – 10.000 km. This limits the 
choice among new aircraft to narrow-body extended range airliners of the Boeing 737 
or Airbus A320 family and the popular long-range narrow-body Boeing 757-200 (Table 
5). Out of the airlines in question, MAXjet and Silverjet, the "value business class" op-
erators, have decided for the medium-sized wide-body Boeing 767-200. Among new 
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aircraft, the Boeing 737 family (Boeing Business Jet 1-3) and the Airbus A320 family 
(A318 Elite - A319LR/ACJ - A320 Prestige) seem to be the aircraft most suited for the 
premium airline business model. The individual types within the family possess com-
mon cockpits and the majority of the parts are identical. This allows for addition of fu-
ture routes with slightly different characteristics and easy integration into the existing 
fleet. The premium airline can thus enjoy the same advantages that low cost carriers 
have partly built their success on, such as economies of scale in operation, especially in 
terms of maintenance and pilot training. In addition, both manufacturers offer the in-
stallment of a variable number of removable auxiliary fuel tanks for these aircraft fami-
lies; this way the range and the size of cargo compartment can be varied according to 
the route requirements and no unnecessary weight needs to be carried. 
 
Airbus 
A318 Elite
Airbus 
A319LR
Airbus 
A320 
Prestige
Boeing 
Business 
Jet 1 (737-
700)
Boeing 
Business 
Jet 2 (737-
800)
Boeing 
Business 
Jet 3 (737-
900)
Boeing 757-
200 
Boeing 767-
200 
Availablility New New New New New New Used New/Used
Range (km) 7,400 8,300 8,565 9,936 8,853 8,825 7,222 12,223
Cargo volume with max aux tanks 330 cu ft n/a n/a 160 cu ft 745 cu ft n/a 1,670 cu ft 2,875  cu ft
Fuel Burn (gallon/block hour) n/a 821 886 690 564 n/a 900 1,217
MTOW (ton) 146 169 n/a 78 79 n/a 116 179
Cabin Area (sq.ft) 823 917 1,058 807 1,004 1,120 1,248 1,667  
Table 5 – Suitable aircraft (compiled by the author from the manufacturers' websites, Eurocontrol 
2006 and ICAO 2000) 
 
As stated earlier, the only relevant routes for the premium airline model are 
routes with sector lengths with the flight duration between 5-10 hours. That translates 
into sectors of 4000 km or more and means that a suitable airliner generally has to have 
intercontinental range. Also, since most of these routes will be at least partly over 
oceans, an ETOPS rated twin engine airliner or a 3- or 4-engined airliner is a necessity. 
The last two mentioned can be excluded because they will not be an option due to their 
significantly higher operating costs as opposed to modern twins. All aircraft in Table 5 
are ETOPS certified. Among the used aircraft that would be alternatively suitable for 
the operation, Boeing 757-200, featuring intercontinental range and state-of-the-art fuel 
efficiency can be identified as a likely choice. However, the operator gives up on the 
possibility of using smaller aircraft from the same family in case new, thinner routes are 
opened. The same applies to Boeing 767-200. 
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The discussion on the viability of the ultra long-haul premium operation above 
focused on the demographic restraints. At this place it should be noted that in case of 
narrow-body airliners, the restraint also lies in the aircraft itself – most of them have 
insufficient range for such operation and further auxiliary fuel tanks would possibly 
mean high cost for the certification or even necessary additional strengthening of struc-
tural parts or reduce the size of the cargo/luggage compartment to a minimum. This 
would make an operation with 50 passengers impossible. Substantial reduction of pas-
senger numbers as an alternative to the installation of additional fuel capacities should 
not be considered. A reduction by 25 passengers in a Boeing Business Jet 2 results in a 
range increase of only about 1.000km (Boeing 2006). 
 
2.5 Market Entry Barriers 
Until recently, and in many countries still, markets for air travel have been diffi-
cult to enter because of the presence of a multitude of market entry barriers when com-
pared to other industries. Although a lot of countries and their regulators have done a lot 
of work in order to open the markets to new entrants and stimulate more competition by 
the means of liberalization, liberalization is not a universal cure. The remaining barriers 
are still significant and lie in the nature of the business (Shepherd 1997:76 in Kummer 
and Schnell 2001:33). Moreover, as a reaction to successful liberalization efforts estab-
lished carriers have often compensated the situation by creating strategic barriers of 
their own, turning the character of the markets from contestable to non-contestable 
again (Joesch and Zick 1994). These barriers include, among others, frequent flyer pro-
grams, code-sharing (Kummer and Schnell 2001:36) and Limit-Pricing (Modigliani 
1958 and Sylos-Labini 1962 in Kummer and Schnell 2001). Joesch and Zick (1994) 
established on a sample of 19 US destination markets that  
 
"it appears that the failure of numerous airlines during the mid-and late-1980s al-
lowed the remaining carriers to strengthen entry barriers and gain more control over 
fares in those markets where there was less competition." 
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The barriers mentioned above are of relevance mainly to the newcomers such as 
Eos Airlines or MAXjet and to a lesser extent, they have implications for the new types 
of services that are introduced by established carriers. 
Perhaps one of the most important barriers in respect to newcomers is their lack 
of goodwill (Baker and Pratt 1989) and the associated sunk costs, most of which need to 
be spend in the area of marketing. Whinston and Collins (1992) even suggest that it is 
possible to judge the extent of sunk costs by the movements of stock market in reaction 
to new routes announced by a newcomer. 
As will be discussed later in the chapter 3.3 Provision of Better Value for the 
Traveler – "Verkehrswertigkeit", the biggest weakness diminishing the value of the 
premium airline offer is the lack of network effects. This finding is in line with the re-
sponses Kummer and Schnell (2001:101) have received when questioning top airline 
executives about the effectiveness of measures in terms of their contribution to an air-
line's financial performance. The top 5 measures listed were "Strategic alliances", "In-
creasing frequency of flights on existing routes", "Code-sharing agreements", "Fre-
quent-flyer programs" and "Adding of new routes"; "Hub-and-spoke system" ranking 
6th. It can be seen that measures fortifying network effect are perceived as very effective 
from the point of view of established airlines. From the customer's viewpoint, the accep-
tance of frequent flyer programs is especially remarkable. The success of the programs 
is supported both by the fact that virtually every major airline offers one as well as by 
research. A study by Long et al. (2003) indicates that frequent business flyers "view 
accruing points as an accomplishment" and even suggest a link between overall quality 
of life of a business traveler and frequent flyer programs (Exhibit 4). However, Whyte 
(2002) claims that  
 
"[frequent flyer] schemes create spurious loyalty and that the issue of loyalty is 
much broader than merely accepting repeat purchase as a proxy for customer satisfac-
tion. Rather it is the conditions and circumstances surrounding the relationship and how 
it is maintained that were found to be important factors." 
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In other words, the instalment of frequent flyer program itself is not the auto-
matic key to success. New premium airlines can still score by designing a program that 
best addresses the business traveler's expectations.  
 
 Groupa Meanb t-value DF Probability 
1 1.85 -1.75 177 0.082 I'm generally happy with my lot 
in life 2 2.15    
1 2.17 -1.99 176 0.049 The benefits received from 
frequent flyer programmes add 
to the quality of my life 2 2.55    
1 3.18 -4.42 180 0.000 In my opinion, the amount of 
flying I do adds to the quality of 
my life 2 4.28    
a Group 1, happy frequent business travelers; group 2, unhappy frequent business travelers. 
b Mean scores on seven-point Likert scale with 1='strongly agree' and 7='strongly disagree'  
Exhibit 4 – Differences between happy and unhappy frequent business travelers on quality of life 
variables (Long et al. 2003) 
 
Another important barrier is the lack of information about demand, which trans-
lates into a requirement for expensive market research (Kummer 2001). However, this is 
not necessarily the case of airlines that were founded by former airline executives, such 
as Eos airlines. 
An important barrier can be associated with the phenomenon known as the 
"ownership of strategic resources" in the form of slots (Kummer 2001) due to the 
mechanism called "grandfather rights" (explained in CAA 2004), meaning that once an 
airline "owns" a slot and utilizes it, the ownership is automatically extended in the next 
periods. This barrier is highly relevant to the airlines operating on the "big pie" routes or 
in case one endpoint of the flight is a hub airport. Point airports are typically not subject 
to this problem. 
 
In sum, the above mentioned phenomena lead to a high start-up capital demand, 
which can be described as a barrier in itself, too. Consequently, the realization of a posi-
tive return on investment is typically of long-term nature. 
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3. Justifications for the Existence of the Premium Airline 
Business Model 
 
3.1 Existence of a Distinct Market 
While the premium airline model has "premium service for a business traveler" 
as a common denominator resulting in a similar products, the actual strategy back-
ground of the market players is different. Michael Porter distinguishes among three ge-
neric strategies  (Porter 1980:ch.2): overall cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. 
Generally, it can be said that for an established carrier the new type of service can be 
seen as a component of differentiation strategy, while for start-up airlines the strategy 
will inevitably be the focus on a distinct customer segment. Adding another layer, one 
can identify the cost leadership approach within the focus strategy in case of the new-
comers (Exhibit 5). 
 
High 
Quality
No 
Frills
Low 
Cost
High 
Cost
Service
Segment
Cost Leadership
Eos
BA, Virgin 
Business 
Class
BA First
Ryanair, 
Easyjet …
Modern 
Business
Class / 
PrivatAir
MaxJet
Upper 
Economy
Economy
Silverjet*
 
Exhibit 5 – Positioning of the different premium airline products *) Based on Silverjet's launch 
prices, regular prices have not been known to date 
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From Lufthansa's or any traditional carrier's point of view, the strategy charac-
terizing their business class-only service is differentiation. By adding a new, different 
service (in terms of new local availability and form of service) to their broad portfolio 
of products, they target an important growing segment to capture a bigger overall mar-
ket share. In the particular case of the business class-only service on a point-to-point or 
point-to-hub basis, the company draws new passengers that are now willing to travel or 
travel more because of the new service. But the majority of passengers are not new to 
the airlines. This specially tailored service, such as Lufthansa's Düsseldorf-Chicago 
route substitutes existing, less convenient routes for most of the clientele. The product is 
tailored to suit executives and managers from specific industries who would previously 
fly to or from the Greater Chicago area to Düsseldorf and the Ruhrgebiet area via 
Frankfurt or Amsterdam's Schiphol. They would have to drive long distances to the air-
port or use a feeder flight and change at least once during the whole trip. 
Eos airlines, on the other hand, target a very small, distinctive clientele. Price 
minded New York and London financial districts' and Canary Wharf managers are sup-
posed to constitute the main body of their customers. Since they are virtually the only 
well defined Eos airlines' target group, it can be said that Eos follows a combination of 
focus and cost leadership strategy. The 78-inch pitch, guest chair, off-set personal suites 
and other features position the product between business and first class. 
 
MAXjet, with 60-inch pitch, less fancy interiors compared to cutting-edge busi-
ness class products and pricing roughly at the level of premium economy class found in 
other carriers calls their product the "Affordable Business Class". Target customers are 
"savvy travelers who seek premium service, comfort and value" (MAXjet 2006a). 
MAXjet does not specify the target group further, but it can be anticipated that the typi-
cal customers could primarily be small and mid-size businesses' executives as well as 
value-driven leisure travelers. 
 
3.2 Existence of the Value Driven Customer 
As mentioned above, both market entrants MAXjet and Eos Airlines have built 
their positioning around the provision of a better value, apart from the premium stan-
dard of service (Exhibit 6). This leads to the observation that the strategy creators at 
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these airlines believed in the existence of a value driven, price elastic business cus-
tomer, regardless whether their assumption was based on scientific findings, industry 
experience or even a belief in self-fulfilling prophecy and a creation of a new market. 
 
Return Fares incl. Fees and Taxes - Business Class
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
Virgin
Atlantic
British
Airways
Continental American
Airlines
Eos Delta MAXjet Silverjet* KLM AMS-
IAH
Swiss ZUR-
EWR
Lufthansa-
PrivatAir
DUS-EWR
Price in USD
Flexible Lowest
London - New York / Different Carriers
Europe - US /
Operated by PrivatAir
 
Exhibit 6 – Business class pricing: typical business trip - departure Monday, February 19, 2007; 
return Thursday, February 22, 2007; queried on November 19, 2006 (3 months prior to the flight) 
via Orbitz.com (all excluding KLM) and Expedia.com (KLM) 
 
Not surprisingly, there is a lot of scientific support to the popular opinion that 
demand for business air travel is rather inelastic. The most obvious reasons are the 
higher cost of time, need for flexibility reducing the number of available substitutes and 
absorption of the cost by the firm and not the individual (Brons et al. 2001). The De-
partment of Finance of Canada in cooperation with the Wilfred Laurier University in 
Waterloo analyzed the findings of several studies on demand elasticity in several market 
segments and came to the observation that long-haul international business travel 
(mostly Australia-UK) is indeed non-elastic (Gillen, Morrison and Stewart 2004) (Ex-
hibit 7). 
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Exhibit 7 – Own price elasticity of demand (Gillen, Morrison and Stewart 2004) 
 
However, the analysis also suggests that interestingly the domestic (mostly 
North-American) long-haul business travel is often rather elastic. Additionally, the fact 
whether the elasticity study was conduced focusing on business travelers or all customer 
segments seems to influence the results. Exhibit 8 shows that studies focusing on the 
business segment tend to obtain higher elasticity for business travelers than studies 
treating more segments. Further, it is possible to employ the time factor. A recent re-
search suggests that compared to previous decades, business travel has become less 
(Brons et al. 2001) or more elastic (Fan and Leung 2005), depending on the market. 
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Distribution of price elasticity estimates from studies on 
business class travelers 
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Exhibit 8 – (a) Distribution of price elasticity estimates from studies on business class travelers and 
other studies (Brons et al. 2001) 
 
Therefore, it seems that it is not possible to establish with absolute certainty, 
whether there is such thing as the price minded business traveler. However, we can have 
a look at some basic lessons from micro-economics to help us find out where we might 
expect the presence of a value-driven business traveler. Generally, products with ready 
substitutes are more price-elastic than those without them (Samuelson and Nordhaus 
2001:68). On the London-New York route with considerable competition and high den-
sity we can expect more price sensitivity than on say, the Düsseldorf-Chicago route. 
This thesis has also been supported by the findings of a recent study (Fan and Leung 
2005) which examined the price differences on dense long-haul international routes. 
One of the conclusions was that the route-specific level of competition had a statisti-
cally significant impact on the fares. Put another way, airlines can charge more because 
the elasticity on a route with less competition will be proportionally lower. Also, ac-
cording to microeconomic theory, demand becomes more elastic in the long term; this 
finding has also been confirmed for air travel by research (Brons et al. 2001). Further-
more, as already mentioned above, the cost cutting pressure on the demand side has 
intensified and has led to reduced spending by companies and new expectations on air-
lines with cost-relevant implications (Exhibit 9). With these findings applied to the cur-
rent situation in the aviation industry which since the start of the liberalization processes 
has been becoming gradually more competitive, we can expect further shift towards 
price elastic demand, i.e. the phenomenon that we might otherwise call a "value driven 
traveler". 
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Future changes in the business market 
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Exhibit 9 – Future changes in the business market (Mason 2002) 
 
In this respect, another factor has to be considered, namely that a considerable 
portion of business travelers sits in the Economy class of service. Also, many of the 
corporations that have their employees travel in the economy class have a less strict 
policy that allows the employee some flexibility as to from which airline the ticket can 
be purchased as long as the budget for the trip or a respective project is kept. This cus-
tomer segment is definitely price sensitive when it comes to the possibility of upgrading 
to business class for a markup that is still within the budget. This group offers the op-
portunity for low-cost premium class alternatives such as MAXjet. Possibly, and more 
importantly, the option to attract some of these customers to their premium cabins as 
long as vacant seats are available is open to the yield management of the airlines. A 
problem in this respect might be the policy of companies of basing the allowance on the 
class of travel than on the price tag. A rigid travel policy could in an absurd case lead to 
the practice of purchasing economy or premium economy tickets at a higher price than 
discounted business class. A value business class airline should hence be interested in 
finding on what level they are ranked in companies' and sales agents' allowance hierar-
chies and take appropriate measures. 
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3.3 Provision of Better Value for the Traveler – "Verkehrswertig-
keit" 
The premium airline model has come into existence on the premise of providing 
a better value for the traveler. In order to verify whether the business model is objec-
tively capable of delivering this promise, it is useful to examine it by a tool called 
"Verkehrswertigkeit" (Voigt 1965). The academic German term can be simply trans-
lated as "value of a transportation service" and will be hereinafter referred to simply as 
"value". It consists of several factors (or KPIs) which cannot be simply added towards a 
numeric bottom line, but are meant to be compared individually. The factors involved 
are: rapidness, mass capacity, connectivity, calculability, frequency, safety, conven-
ience. In the following, the individual components of the "value" will be discussed with 
focus on identifying differences between the premium and the traditional mixed class 
business model. 
 
3.3.1 Rapidness 
The rapidness factor expresses how fast the traveler gets from door (of his ori-
gin) to door (of his destination), i.e. the time of commute to the airport is included. It is 
be evaluated on a set of two sample trips (Düsseldorf-New York, London-New York) 
and two different types of passengers – a passenger originating or terminating his trip in 
the Düsseldorf / London area; a transfer passenger for whom the routes are only a sec-
tion of the total trip. The evaluation is summarized in Table 6. 
The specific characteristics of the business model in terms of infrastructure in-
fluences the duration of the total journey. Hub-airports are in disadvantage due to con-
gestion and long walking times. A recent study has concluded that the hub strategy 
 
"has led to increasing congestion both in the air and on the ground and has given 
rise to frequent flight delays. The congestion wrought by the hub system has eroded air 
travel's speed advantage, especially on shorter trips...By avoiding large-scale hubs, new 
carriers are able to provide better service at a lower price." (Frits and Holweg 2003) 
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This is a referral to the success of low-cost airlines on a point to point basis. 
Surely, on long-haul routes the time saved by flying a point-to-point or point-to-hub 
rather than hub-to-hub connection is a significantly smaller portion of the total travel 
time than on a typical low-cost flight. Also, hub airports profit from the high frequency 
of flights, which especially benefits transferring passengers. Travelers utilizing a pre-
mium flight from a point airport will find it less congested and possibly more accessible 
depending on their location. However, transferring passengers will often have to re-
check-in their luggage due to lack of interlining or wait longer due to lower frequency 
on these flights. From these patterns it is possible to derive an observation that the pre-
mium airline model operating from an alternative airport will be best suitable for serv-
ing local demand. This customer group can benefit from less congestion and possibly 
faster access to the airport. It will generally not be the choice for transfer passengers 
unless interlining agreements exist and frequencies are increased. 
 
Rapidness 
Traditional Hub-Hub 
(e.g. Frankfurt - New York) 
PrivatAir 
(e.g. Düsseldorf – New York) 
 
Evaluation Suggested 
measure 
Evaluation Suggested 
Measure 
Originating 
passenger 
Slower be-
cause of con-
gestion 
 
More efficient 
processes (lim-
ited room for 
improvement) 
 
Faster, no 
feeding flight to 
a German or 
Dutch hub re-
quired, less 
congested air-
port 
 
No improve-
ment needed 
 
Transferring 
passenger 
Slower transfer 
due to size of 
airport, but 
possibly less 
waiting time 
due to higher 
frequency of 
flights 
More efficient 
processes 
around the 
transfer (lim-
ited room for 
improvement) 
 
Faster transfer 
due to size of 
airport, but 
possibly more 
waiting due to 
low frequen-
cies 
 
No economi-
cally viable 
improvement 
possible 
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Rapidness 
Traditional Hub-Hub 
(e.g. Frankfurt - New York) 
PrivatAir 
(e.g. Düsseldorf – New York) 
 
Evaluation Suggested 
measure 
Evaluation Suggested 
Measure 
Originating 
passenger 
Equal* 
 
More efficient 
check-in proc-
esses possible, 
however, no 
significant im-
pact, location 
of the cus-
tomer is more 
significant 
Equal*  More efficient 
check-in proc-
esses possible, 
however, no 
significant im-
pact, location 
of the cus-
tomer is more 
significant 
Transferring 
passenger 
Faster due to 
higher fre-
quencies, but 
shortcomings 
resulting from 
airport conges-
tion and scale 
More efficient 
processes 
around the 
transfer 
Slower - no 
interlining and 
low frequen-
cies 
More efficient 
processes 
around trans-
fer, interlining 
agreements 
 
Table 6 – Rapidness evaluation 
*) Depending on the customer's location within London, for a certain group of 
passengers, one of the airports might be closer resulting in some time saving and the 
check-in/boarding times resulting from different airports might differ slightly as well. 
Maximum time saved is estimated to be around 15% (1 hour) under ideal conditions, 
which might already be an incentive for a passenger to decide for one or the other ser-
vice. 
 
3.3.2 Mass Capacity 
The next factor in the "value" toolset is mass capacity which has been included 
by its author mainly for the purposes of goods transportation; nevertheless, as an inte-
gral part of the toolset it should be equally applied to passenger services at this place. 
Typically the business class compartment will offer seating for 30-80 business class 
passengers and additional 10-30 first class seats on a mixed flight using a wide-body 
airliner. For our use this indicator is of rather low importance since the capacities of-
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fered will be proportional to the expected demand (higher for hubs, lower for point-to-
point) and the capacity will not be a constraint in most times of the operation. However, 
in case of peak demand the probability that a seat is available on MAXjet's or Silverjet's 
"value business class" with a capacity of ~100 passengers is likely higher than in case of 
the lower capacity mixed flights. This means that these airlines could be possibly less 
prone to the risk of adverse customer reaction as a response to product unavailability 
(Wilkinson and Berry 1978). 
 
There is a significant difference in one, in our context rather marginal aspect – 
the cargo hold capacity. While some transcontinental wide-body jets that are usually 
used on mixed transcontinental flights can accommodate standard size 8 by 8 feet ISO 
containers (Shaw 1999:138), narrow-body and some wide-body aircraft cannot. Apart 
from this, narrow-body airliners with transcontinental reach such as the Boeing Busi-
ness Jet or Airbus A319LR have additional fuel tanks installed in the bottom section of 
the fuselage, making the space of the cargo hold shrink to a minimum, thus excluding 
any additional revenue from cargo operations or even limiting the acceptance of excess 
baggage. Since cargo capacities on passenger planes are generally sold at prices that are 
close to marginal costs, the impact of no freight operations is negligible. 
 
3.3.3 Connectivity 
Connectivity or the "ability to build networks" is one of the aspects where most 
premium-class airlines will pull on the shorter end.  This phenomenon is enrooted in the 
following factors: 
 
1. Premium-class model offers only limited frequencies, mostly once or twice a 
day, as opposed to hub based services offering multiple flights daily in the same 
direction. 
2. Lack of interlining (MAXjet, Eos Airlines) is prohibitive to networking. 
3. Small or low-cost airports on one or both endpoints of the route offer limited 
possibilities for networking. 
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The disadvantage of the premium-model resulting from the factors above trans-
lates into the heavy dependency on traffic originating and terminating at the respective 
ends of their routes. 
 
3.3.4 Calculability 
Calculability is the assessment of the probability that the transport will be exe-
cuted on time. Air travel takes place in a very dynamic and complex environment and a 
multitude of factors (weather, dispatch reliability, strikes, delays of connecting flights, 
etc.) influence whether a traveler will get on time to his/her destination. While airlines 
have very little control over these external elements, they differ in the degree of readi-
ness for coping with them. Traveler choosing a hub-based mixed connection is more 
likely to get to his/her destination on time for the following reasons: 
 
1. Usually, more flights daily are available. 
2. Interlining makes switching easier in case of denied boarding. 
3. Bigger hub-based operations will find it easier to substitute an aircraft in case of 
a technical failure preventing a departure. 
4. If departure or landing is not possible at a particular airport, for instance because 
of adverse weather conditions or strike, network airline will often be able to of-
fer substitute to a nearest airport. 
5. Passenger failing to appear for take-off due to late arrival at the airport will have 
few or no equivalent substitute from airports like Düsseldorf or Stansted. 
 
On the other hand, point-to-point/hub connections often offer the advantage of 
less congested airports resulting in a lower probability of delay (Frits and Holweg 
2003), also demonstrated by a good record of Eos Airlines in 2006 (Eos 2006a). 71% of 
Eos' arrivals and departures were on time between January and June 2006, making the 
airline the most punctual carrier on the London - New York route. In addition, strikes, 
which are occasionally a source of delays or cancelled flights, are more likely to take 
place within a strongly unionized network carrier or a hub airport rather than their 
smaller counterparts.  However, as concluded above, hub-based operations are generally 
prepared better to cope with force-majeure-like situations. 
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It should be noted that the traveler's awareness of the calculability, especially re-
garding force-majeure-like events, might be very low and not taken into account when 
making a travel decision. However, an experienced frequent business traveler is likely 
to consider this aspect. 
 
3.3.5 Frequency 
The frequency-factor is one of the arguable strengths of a hub-based network 
carrier. Hub based airlines often offer more flights per route daily, thus giving the cus-
tomer a better choice. Also, in case of denied boarding or any problems with a particular 
flight there is a possibility for the business passenger to take the next one, provided that 
capacity is available. 
Nevertheless, the premium airline model has an opportunity to at least partly off-
set this disadvantage by timing the flights in a manner that the departure times are the 
most convenient for the target group. This is relatively straightforward for transatlantic 
flights, where an early morning departure westbound and overnight flight eastbound 
will be most typically chosen. Partnering agreement with other airlines (such as between 
Eos and MAXjet) can help in case of emergency preventing the departure of a flight. 
 
3.3.6 Safety 
All airlines operating at one or both ends of the route in Europe or North Amer-
ica have to adhere to the strict standards set by the authorities of the respective states. 
From this point of view there is no difference between the premium-class-only opera-
tions and mixed airlines and this perception is shared by a well-traveled business pas-
senger. Although there is no recent (younger than 10 years) research on how safe air 
travel is being perceived by the traveling public, a study from a previous period indi-
cates that thanks to the unnatural environment, mystery of crash causation and other 
elements (Grose 1995), people might still be sensitive to indicators relating to airline 
safety. Another research revealed that people's perception of safety is often quite distant 
from the actual safety performance (Berkman et al. 1982), giving room to airlines to 
improve their safety image through marketing. Furthermore, it is likely that "business 
executives and investors are predominantly risk evaders" (Pappas and Brigham 1979 in 
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Grose 1995) Since airline accidents are most likely to happen during the take-off, climb, 
approach and landing phases (Aviation Safety Network 2006), it is much more safety-
relevant whether the flight is direct or with transfers. If a multiple-stop trip is chosen 
instead of a non-stop flight, the probability of the accident rises with the number of cy-
cles. Since the statistical probability of an accident for a multi-stop flight is still very 
low and within an acceptable limit, most passengers being unaware of the multiplier 
phenomenon, the aspect of safety has no relevance for the differentiation between the 
premium airline model and its conventional counterpart. However, new entrants, not 
enjoying the goodwill of established network carriers such as British Airways or Luf-
thansa yet, are advised to monitor safety perception among their customers as well as 
the influencing factors, be it marketing or the perception of the age and state of the air-
craft interior and exterior. 
 
3.3.7 Convenience / Comfort 
The convenience factor encompasses a broad range of aspects and can be de-
fined more or less widely. For the purpose of the study we should concentrate only on 
those that create a possible difference for the passenger that is making a decision be-
tween a premium and a traditional airline.  
The time factor, also being part of the convenience perception, has been dis-
cussed under "rapidness" and thus will be omitted at this point. 
First, passenger choosing to travel from a smaller point-airport using the pre-
mium service will be likely experiencing a lower degree of congestion affecting the 
perception of convenience compared to a hub. Second, many passengers prefer the com-
fort of the all-business class cabin with a professional atmosphere and no or signifi-
cantly less children and other potentially loud passengers on board, as opposed to a 
mixed flight. 
This is equally true for transferring passengers with interlining airlines. A busi-
ness passenger from Berlin, for instance, wishing to travel to Chicago and arrive around 
12pm will have the choice of traveling via Frankfurt or Munich using the mixed service 
or via Düsseldorf with the all business class Lufthansa-PrivatAir product. There is little 
or no difference in price, departure or arrival times and hence the premium operation 
will likely be the more attractive option. However, transferring at an airport dominated 
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by no-frills carriers such as London-Stansted requires the traveler to use a low-cost 
feeding flight which means a lower level of comfort on at least on leg of the trip. Fur-
thermore, the traveler will likely need to re-check-in his or her luggage because of lack 
of interlining agreements among the airlines present at these airports. These burdens 
virtually exclude Eos and MAXjet airlines from the possibility of benefiting from trans-
ferring passengers at these airports. 
 
3.3.8 Implications 
The theoretical analysis of the value of the premium airline service to the cus-
tomer yields results that are to a large extent in line with the findings of previous field 
research on low cost airlines; connectivity  being perceived as the biggest issue (Exhibit 
10). In line with the research on market entry barriers (treated earlier in the chapter 2.5 
Market Entry Barriers) which identifies hub-and-spoke networks as responsible for nu-
merous competitive advantages (Kummer and Schnell 2001) that can be as well seen as 
barriers for new entrants, the lack thereof can be seen as the main shortcoming of the 
premium airline business model. 
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Exhibit 10 – Disadvantages of using low cost airlines (Mason 2002) 
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In the seven areas examined, the premium airline model currently compensates 
the lack of network strengths only in one area – convenience / comfort (Exhibit 11). 
Thus, the airline has to rely solely on the local demand originating in the catchment area 
of the point airport. This is not necessarily a critical issue if the region is capable of 
supplying sufficient demand. In case the airline does not choose to or does not have the 
option of improving its connectivity, the presence of only one significant competitive 
advantage (out of the ones in the toolset) has significant implications. The airline has to 
defend the competitive advantage by continuously improving the convenience / comfort 
elements of their service. Eos Airlines seem to have adopted this approach with the de-
livery of new, partly difficult to replicate convenience / comfort service elements such 
as the award winning seating concept, cooperation with a concierge service, "curbside 
escort", and express security line. Alternatively or complementarily, measures aimed at 
reducing the negatives resulting from the lack of the network effects can be taken. Eos 
and MAXjet flights are now available in Global Distribution Systems (GDS) such as 
Galileo, Sabre or Worldspan. Further, Eos has introduced an innovative loyalty program 
giving customers the possibility to use earned points (unlike other frequent flyer pro-
grams, Eos uses points and not miles as units) for a flight with any major airline and not 
just a particular alliance. The option of striving for interlining agreements remains open 
but has a very limited potential in London Stansted, judging by the domination by low-
cost airlines and their negative attitude towards interlining. Nevertheless, Southwest 
Airlines has entered into a code-sharing agreement with ATA (Evanoff 2006); it needs 
to be kept in mind that Southwest has a stake in ATA. JetBlue has also shown interest in 
the same direction (ATW 2006). Thus, it would not be a wholly unexpected develop-
ment in Europe either. For instance, a code-sharing agreement between MAXjet and 
EasyJet might be a logical step that MAXjet could pursue. 
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Value of the Transporation Service
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Exhibit 11 – Premium airline service value (author, Voigt 1965) 
 
It should be kept in mind that cost leadership, which can be a valid source of 
competitive advantage, is not included in the "value" toolset. Although there is not a 
universal definition of what service value is, it is widely accepted that value does not 
incorporate only the "get" aspect but also the "give" aspect. A good definition of service 
value is given by Zeithaml (1988:14): Service value can be understood as 
 
"consumer's overall assessment of the utility of a product based on perceptions 
of what is received for what is given. Though what is received varies across consumers 
(i.e., some may want volume, others high quality, still others convenience) and what is 
given varies (i.e., some are concerned only with money expended, others with time and 
effort), value represents a tradeoff of the salient give and get components." 
 
Hence, in the evaluation of the service value of the premium airline business 
model, it is necessary to incorporate the price component. In that case, cost leadership 
can be a source of competitive advantage along with the service focus on comfort and 
convenience (Exhibit 11). 
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4. Operating Economics 
In this chapter the operating economics of the premium airline operation will be 
analyzed and compared to the traditional airline model. For this purpose, a spreadsheet 
model has been devised. The chapter is divided into the description of the model and the 
underlying data, followed by the analysis of the output from multiple aspects. Finally, 
implications are drawn from the findings. 
 
4.1 The Model – Description 
In order to make the comparison of the operational economics of traditional air-
lines and the premium airlines a spreadsheet model has been devised for this purpose 
(see Appendix – Model Data). The model calculates operating costs on a block hour 
basis and is divided into an Input and an Output part. The costs were modeled from the 
outside view, i.e. none of the values or assumptions are based on internal information 
from the respective companies. The Output part corresponds with the typical airline cost 
structure used by ICAO (Doganis 2002:79) and represents the cost blocks on a block 
hour basis computed from the data entered in the Input section. Please note that espe-
cially the values of indirect operating costs differ significantly depending on the base 
airport and home country, being influenced mainly by the different cost of personnel 
across the base countries. Since it is impossible to judge in how far airlines allocate 
overhead cost to individual items, the approach of allocating as much as possible to-
wards specific items was chosen (i.e. as if the airlines were heavily outsourcing) in or-
der to achieve highest possible comparability. Consequently, the administrative and 
general overhead (B.4) is accordingly low. 
In the following, the Output items, always starting with a letter, and the underly-
ing Input variables which are numbered (in brackets) will be explained. For detailed 
description of how the individual Input values were obtained for a particular flight, 
please refer to 4.3 Input Section (Assumptions) . 
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4.2 The Model – Output Section 
A1.1. The cost of Fuel and Oil is calculated on the basis of the entered fuel burn 
(6) and the average fuel price (23) for the respective route.  
 
A1.2. The cost of the flight crew (pilots) is calculated as the product of the en-
tered yearly salary for the captain (12) (and first officer (13)) and the associated payroll 
expenses factor (15) (which includes all the expenses associated with the payroll that 
the employer has to come up with such as any related taxes, insurance costs, social se-
curity, international per diem compensation, fringe benefits etc.). It is assumed that the 
pilots fly 80 hours a month on average. The block hour cost for cabin crew thus are the 
salaries of the captain and first officer multiplied by the additional payroll expenses 
factor and divided by 12 and 80 (12 months, 80 hours a month). 
 
A.1.3.1. Airport charges consist of the landing fee (26) at the destination airport 
and terminal fees (27, 28) (passenger based, average load factor (20-22) taken into ac-
count) at both the departure and the destination airport. In order to obtain the hourly 
cost these are divided by the flight time. 
 
A.1.3.2. En-route charges are the average navigation charges per block hour 
(25). These have to be computed for each route because the charges differ across the 
airspaces of different countries that are being flown over and are typically derived from 
the MTOW (Maximum take-off weight) of the aircraft. 
 
A.1.5. Aircraft Rental / Lease are the costs of aircraft rental (depreciation is 
treated separately under A.3.) per block hour (4). If the aircraft is rented under a wet-
lease agreement or even with staff, the costs for the respective items, i.e. fuel (23) and 
crew (12-14) have to be set to zero accordingly. 
 
A.2. Maintenance cost - is entered on block hour basis (7) and depends on the 
type and age of aircraft used. Airlines and aviation professionals will usually have a 
good knowledge of what the block hour maintenance rate for their aircraft type is. 
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A.3. Depreciation – expresses the block hour cost based on a simple linear de-
preciation scheme where the purchasing price (1), number of years in service (2) and 
residual value (3) are the input variables. The block hour rate of depreciation is com-
puted for a typical transatlantic operation of 2 flights per day (one westbound and one 
eastbound) on the same route and 6 weekdays of operation. The annual utilization is 
around 4,350 hours in case of the London – New York route and close to 5,000 hours in 
case of the Düsseldorf – New York route. This is in line with utilizations achieved by 
airlines with primary long-haul focus – i.e. Thai Airways fleet in 1999 had an average 
utilization of 5,000 hours (Doganis 2002:84). 
 
B.1. Station / Ground Expenses – include the cost of ground operations such as 
towing, de-icing, ground power and costs of own operations on the ground, etc. The 
input value (24) is the average per-flight cost of ground operations at the departure and 
arrival airports combined. The value is then divided by the flight time in order to obtain 
the block hour rate. 
 
B.2.1. Cabin crew cost is computed in the same way as the pilots' cost – the vari-
ables to be entered are the flight attendants' yearly salary (14) and the average number 
of attendants per flight (16), all other assumptions about flying time and associated ex-
penses factor are identical with those for the flight crew. 
 
B.2.2. Other passenger service cost is the cost of passenger service on board and 
on the ground. In practice the expense on board is limited to the cost of meal(s) and po-
tentially an amenity kit distributed to the passenger (32-34).  
The cost of ground passenger services includes the cost of pre- and post-flight 
services offered to passengers on the ground. The level of pre- and post-flight service is 
one of the main differentiators for the different classes of travel (lounge, buffet, escort 
service). Hence, the cost of service will differ among classes of travel and has to be en-
tered separately for each class (29-31). It is assumed that airlines have a per-passenger 
flat rate for these services. 
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To obtain the total block hour cost of passenger services for the flight, the model 
takes into account the numbers of passengers in different travel classes (17-22) and the 
flight duration. 
 
B.2.3. Passenger Insurance is the cost of insurance of passengers on a block hour 
basis. The cost of insurance per passenger (35) is entered as input. 
 
B.3.1. Ticketing, Sales – the costs of ticketing and sales on a block hour basis. 
The input variable is the average cost of sales and ticketing per passenger per flight 
(36). 
 
B.3.2. Promotion, Advertising – is the average customer acquisition and reten-
tion cost per flight per passenger (37). Customer acquisition and retention cost is typi-
cally computed as the overall promotion and advertising expenses of an airline divided 
by the number of passengers actually using the service. Costs of a frequent flyer pro-
gram and cost of handling complaints of passengers can be also included in this item. 
 
B.4. Administration and Other Costs - This item includes administrative ex-
penses and all other costs incurred by the airline. The cost is to be entered on a per flight 
basis (38). 
 
4.3 The Model – Input Section (Assumptions) 
1. Aircraft price – price paid for the new aircraft at the time of its purchase was es-
tablished on the basis of the nominal price quoted on manufacturers' price lists. 
If not available, articles about purchases of aircraft by airlines were used, also to 
assess the extent of potential rebates. In case of green aircraft delivery by the 
original manufacturer, anticipated interior cost is included. 
 
2. The depreciation period was chosen to be 15 years, based on Doganis 
(2002:83f).  Since it is hard to establish a universal period of use and an assump-
tion has to be made (the depreciation policy is solely in the competence of air-
lines; some prefer to depreciate over very short periods of 10 years and sell the 
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aircraft for still a good price, e.g. Singapore Airlines; in Doganis 2002:84) 
whereas aircraft of other airlines (for instance many American carriers) often 
stay in service for well over 15 years and are subsequently sold cheaply for a 
couple of years of freight operations. Also it is a common practice to depreciate 
more in good years so that the book value of the aircraft is substantially lower 
than its real value.  
 
3. Residual value is assumed to be 10% of the new price. This is in line with re-
ported sales or purchases of aircraft of comparable age and condition (i.e. Ha-
waiian Airlines reported buying four 767-300 planes at $32 million total; Hawai-
ian Airlines 2006). 
 
4. A/C Rental – is not applicable, all aircraft in the sample are assumed to be in the 
ownership of the respective airline 
 
5. A/C Insurance – assumed to be 3% of new aircraft price, based on Doganis 
(2001:81). 
 
6. The average fuel burn is taken based on ICAO's data (ICAO 2000) and Eurocon-
trol's Base of Aircraft Data (Crook, Tanner and Anderson 2004). 
 
7. Maintenance cost for PrivatAir's A319 are based on articles reporting mainte-
nance expenses for operation of similar aircraft (Frontier Airlines, having re-
peatedly received the FAA's Diamond Award for maintenance, report in their 
SEC-filings maintenance expenses of $600-800 per block hour for a mixed fleet 
of new A319 and older B737 (Frontier Airlines 2002). A lower rate of $400 was 
adopted for PrivatAir to reflect the reduced number of cycles and younger age of 
aircraft. Another source of benchmarks was the analysis of real life examples 
published in the Airline Monitor (Greenslet 2003). 
 
8. Average cruising speed at operating altitude is needed to compute total operating 
time for the flight. The total operating time (engines up) is computed by dividing 
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the sector length (entered under 39) by speed5 plus a 1/2 hour reserve for taxiing 
and time spend in holding pattern and such. 
 
9. – 11. Aircraft passenger cabin floor area was established from the data available 
for the aircraft types on the manufacturer's website, for different classes of travel 
it was approximated using cabin layouts from the website www.seatguru.com 
(SeatGuru 2006). 
 
12. Captains' yearly salary is estimated upon online sources such as 
www.airlinepilotcentral.com (Airline Pilot Central 2006). Apart from the type 
rating, the geographical location of the respective airline's headquarters (where 
most pilots are going to be sourced) was considered in the calculations. 
 
13. First Officer's salary – same as 12. 
 
14. Cabin crew salaries are estimated on the base of the salaries reported by the air-
lines, e.g. (MAXjet 2006b). Geographical base of the airline is taken into ac-
count as in the case of captains and first officer's salary. 
 
15. Additional payroll expenses factor (Lohnnebenkosten) – is a factor by which 
each salary has to be multiplied in order to obtain the real expense of the em-
ployee to the airline. The factor includes all the expenses associated with the 
payroll that the employer has to come up with such as any related taxes, insur-
ance costs, social security, international per diem compensation, fringe benefits 
etc. For the purpose of this analysis, standard rates of expenses factors for each 
airline's home country were taken (Huonker 2000). To reflect the higher level of 
expenses associated per diem compensation of aviation employees the factors 
was increased by 0.2 flat for every airline. 
 
                                                 
5 Mach 1 at FL3XX equals ~ 300 m.s-1 
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16. The number of cabin crew was established upon information available on the re-
spective companies' websites and press releases (Swiss 2006, Flug Revue 2004, 
Adams 2006) 
 
17. – 19. The number of seats in each class of service was established upon the in-
formation available on the respective companies' websites or press releases. 
 
20. – 22. The load factors can be varied in order to see the effect on the economics. 
In the model situation presented the load factors were chosen arbitrarily at the 
same level of 70% to enable comparison across the airlines. The load factor in 
British Airways' First Class was assumed to be 50%. 
 
23. Jet average jet fuel of $1.8 per US-gallon in November 2006, as published by 
IATA (IATA 2006) in its Jet Fuel Price Monitor was used to enable comparison 
across the airlines. 
 
24. Ground / Station expenses – this item includes the cost of the airline's own 
ground operations as well as the cost of contracted services such as towing, 
ground power or de-icing. The actual numbers used in the model situation were 
estimated based on adding up the costs of ground handling and de-icing and a 
markup of 20% on top of these to allow for a reserve for other ground opera-
tions. 
The cost of de-icing is one of the most unpredictable items in the calcula-
tions of airlines operating from airports located in continental climate zone as is 
the case for any transatlantic flight in question. In our calculations we will as-
sume that an average of 5% (EFM 2006) departures during the de-icing season 
(November-March +- 1 month) needs de-icing. Smaller airlines will typically 
have a de-icing agreement with the de-icing provider at their airport, bigger air-
lines will have own de-icing operations or will outsource de-icing as well. Both 
the agreement (often with a base fee paid before the season, independent of the 
actual need for de-icing services and a variable portion depending on the actual 
use of de-icing fluid and number of de-icing events) or own de-icing operations 
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have the effect of making the future costs predictable because fixed costs (base 
fee or own fixed costs) are this way a significant portion of the de-icing budget.  
It should be noted that a premium-class operation with the typical utiliza-
tion of 14-16 hours a day and the aircraft flying eastbound overnight is very fa-
vorable in terms of de-icing costs since the aircraft will not be parked at night 
(coldest hour of the day) and the longest turnaround time takes place at the US 
airport during afternoon hours (i.e. most likely the warmest hours of the day) 
thus minimizing snow layer or ice formation during the time on the ground. 
Our calculation of the ground/station expenses are on a per flight basis. A 
yearly de-icing budget for a A319 or Boeing Business Jet will be around 
$100.000-150.000 per season (depending on airport and de-icing agreement, 5% 
of departures subject to de-icing, consumption of 200-400 liters6 of Type-1 fluid 
and occasional need for Type-4 fluid treatment) translating into an average of 
$200 per flight (624 yearly flights at 6 flights a week). Further costs include the 
costs of towing – calculated to be $150 on average and the cost of ground power 
(needed on average 1 hour before departure due to the regulatory requirement 
for an air-conditioned passenger cabin) estimated to average at $100 (regardless 
whether using APU or GPU for power supply). The sum is then multiplied by 
factor 4 (derived from balance sheets of airlines) to allow for overhead in form 
of own baggage handling, ground crew, depreciation of own buildings, etc. 
 
25. Navigation charges differ widely across countries, thus any airline will have to 
compute the exact distance flown in each controlled airspace and apply the ap-
propriate charges for each airspace. Typically the largest portion of the flight 
will take place over the Atlantic Ocean with the responsible ATC Prestwick and 
Gander. The rest of the route will be charged according to Eurocontrol's tariffs 
(Eurocontrol 2006) on the European and the US ATC's on the US side. Gener-
ally, a function containing a square root is used such as  
 
 Rate * √ (MTOW / Factor) * Distance 
 
                                                 
6 About 200 litres are necessary for a light snow cover without icing 
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 leading to a less than linear increase in the charge with growing MTOW. 
 Average charge for Airbus A319LR on a block hour basis (transformed from the 
 distance basis as charged by the authorities) will then be around $500. The 
 same approach has been applied to the other flights. 
 
26. Landing fees differ widely across different airports – up to threefold difference 
is no exception. Landing fees are calculated as a function of MTOW and allow 
for a standard turnaround without any additional charge. In case of a longer 
pause between landing and the next departure additional parking will cost extra 
(this has been allowed for in the factor of 4 under 24.Ground/station expenses). 
In our sample routes average fees have been used estimated on the basis of an 
airport pricing report that was prepared for the Canada Transportation Act Re-
view in 2001 (Gillen, Henriksson and Morisson 2001) as well as official prices 
as long as available (Port Authority of NY & NJ 2006). 
 
27. -28. Terminal fees are passenger-related charges levied by the airports. For our 
calculations we assume terminal fees per passenger between $15 and 30 depend-
ing on the airport. 
 
29. -31. The average costs of ground passenger service in the airport lounges for 
business und first class passengers is assumed to be $20 (Business) and $30 
(First) for the purpose of our calculations. 
 
32. -34. Meal & Entertainment cost is passenger-related. Airlines usually have a flat 
rate per passengers for different classes of service. Rates used in this projection 
were established based on the service descriptions and average between $40 and 
50 for Business Class. 
 
35. Passenger insurance – Flat fee passenger insurance per passenger per flight is 
based on the rate of 70 US-cent per 1,000 revenue passenger kilometers based 
on Doganis (2002:86), reflecting the situation after 9/11 and conservative ap-
proach. 
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36. Ticketing, sales – similarly as in previous items, in the calculation a flat fee of 
$30 per passenger for the premium airline operations and $15 for the mixed op-
eration will be used. In reality the cost of ticketing and sales will widely differ 
across passenger groups depending on which distribution channel is utilized. Di-
rect sales of e-tickets through the airline's website will cost the airline signifi-
cantly less than provision based sales of business tickets by a specialized agent.  
 
37. Promotion and advertising expenses are very rarely explicitly stated in airlines' 
profit and loss accounts. Thus, the customer acquisition and retention cost can 
be established only indirectly on the basis of cost structures reported by airlines. 
Airlines report differing promotion and advertising costs (Pender and Baum 
2000). The cost on short-haul routes appears to be around 3-5% of total operat-
ing cost, for a long-haul route a lower portion, around 2-3%, is anticipated. 
Start-up airlines or new routes or types of services (such as the premium class 
only service) will have to calculate with higher advertising and promotion ex-
penses because of increased brand and market presence building activities. Flat 
customer acquisition and retention cost per passenger per flight has been 
adopted for each airline reflecting its goodwill and market presence. The ex-
pense is assumed to be between $40 and 50 for the start-up airlines, $30 for new 
premium routes by established carriers and $15 for the traditional mixed opera-
tion on established routes. 
 
38. Administration and other costs were also estimated indirectly based on cost 
structure reported by other airlines. For the model situation a flat rate of 2% of 
total operating expenses for the start-up airlines was taken as a basis and 4% for 
the traditional airlines. Airlines often report substantially higher overheads; this 
can be ascribed to either insufficient allocation towards concrete cost blocks or 
higher portion of short-haul flights in which case the weight of the overhead is 
much higher. 
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39. Sector Length is needed to compute the average flight duration. The actual sec-
tor lengths used as input in the model were obtained from a mileage calculator 
on the website webflyer.com. 
 
4.4 Analysis of Operating Economics 
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the economics of the premium-class 
and mixed operations as well as the different premium class variants among each other. 
The sample chosen for the task consists of five different routes, each operated by a dif-
ferent airline – 3 premium and 2 mixed class flights were chosen (Table 7). 
  
Airline Route Aircraft 
Lufthansa 
(Operated by PrivatAir) 
Düsseldorf (DUS) – Newark 
(EWR) 
Airbus Corporate Jet 
(A319LR) 
MAXjet Stansted (STN) – New York 
(JFK) 
Boeing 767-200ER 
Eos Airlines Stansted (STN) – New York 
(JFK) 
Boeing 757-200 
British Airways London Heathrow (LHR) – 
New York (JFK) 
Boeing 747-400 
Air France Paris (CDG) – New York 
(JFK) 
Airbus A330-200 
Table 7 – Sample flights 
 
 In addition to the comparison in absolute numbers (Exhibit 12), the costs of the 
single items are compared on a block hour basis as a percentage of the total operating 
costs (Exhibit 13) in order to achieve highest possible comparability. 
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Operating Economics - Absolute
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Exhibit 12 – Operating economics (absolute) 
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Exhibit 13 – Operating economics (relative, as percent of total cost) 
 
In order to identify significant deviations that characterize a particular flight, a 
simple variance analysis tool has been devised (Exhibit 14) . It works as following: The 
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value of a cost item for a particular flight is subtracted from the average for the five 
flights. The differential is than compared to the standard deviation for the five flights 
and is highlighted in case its value is above or under that of the standard deviation. If 
the costs are significantly higher (i.e. above the standard deviation), they are highlighted 
in red. If they are significantly lower, they are highlighted in green. The following 
analysis is subdivided into the analysis of direct and indirect operating costs, followed 
by the analysis of selected KPIs and a sensitivity analysis. Consequently, the findings 
are summarized in the chapter Summary of the Findings, Implications. 
 
O U T P U T Variance Analysis
OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR / USD LH-PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752 et - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
@ 70% Load Factor* DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
A. Direct Operating Cost 0.2% 1.6% -2.2% -0.5% 0.9%
A.1. Flight Operations 1.4% 0.2% -3.0% -0.1% 1.5%
A.1.1. Fuel and Oil -2.1% 0.4% -1.0% -2.4% 5.1%
A.1.2. Flight Crew Salaries and Expenses 4.0% 0.7% -1.1% -0.3% -3.3%
A.1.3. Airport & En-route Charges -1.6% -1.7% -0.2% 2.4% 1.1%
A.1.3.1. Airport Charges -2.5% -2.7% -0.7% 2.9% 3.0%
A.1.3.2. En-route Charges (Navigation) 0.9% 1.1% 0.5% -0.5% -2.0%
A.1.4. A/C Insurance 1.0% 0.8% -0.7% 0.2% -1.3%
A.1.5. Rental / Lease (of A/C, Crew) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
A.2. Maintenance -3.2% -0.3% 2.2% -0.6% 2.0%
A.3. Depreciation A/C 2.0% 1.7% -1.4% 0.3% -2.6%
B. Indirect Operating Cost -0.2% -1.6% 2.2% 0.5% -0.9%
B.1. Station / Ground Expenses -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%
B.2. Passenger Services -0.1% 0.0% 1.6% -0.3% -1.3%
B.2.1. Cabin Crew Salaries and Expenses -0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% -0.7%
B.2.2. Other Passenger Service Costs 0.4% -0.1% 1.4% -0.9% -0.8%
B.2.3. Passenger Insurance -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
B.3. Ticketing, Sales, Promotion -1.0% -0.1% 1.8% -0.4% -0.4%
B.3.1. Ticketing, Sales -0.3% -0.5% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
B.3.2. Promotion, Advertising -0.7% 0.4% 1.2% -0.4% -0.4%
B.4. Administration and Other Costs 1.0% -1.4% -1.2% 0.9% 0.7%
All Business Class Mixed Class
 
Exhibit 14 – Variance analysis 
 
4.4.1 Direct Operating Costs – Findings 
Direct operating costs (A) consist of Flight Operations, Maintenance and Depre-
ciation and make up approximately 75% of an airline's total operating cost. The biggest 
cost block are the Flight Operations (A1) accounting for about 55% of the total operat-
ing cost. The choice of aircraft is clearly reflected in the operating economics. Flight 
Operations are comparatively the biggest block for Lufthansa's Airbus A319LR and 
British Airways' Boeing 747, although for different reasons – they are mainly driven by 
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the impact of flight crew salaries and navigation charges in case of the small Airbus, 
and fuel and airport expenses in case of the British Airways operation. In the following, 
we will look in detail at the individual cost blocks. It should be noted that the analysis is 
applied exclusively to the lowest level of the cost structure (e.g. for A.1.3 Airport & En-
route Charges the findings are only analyzed for the sub-items A.1.3.1 Airport Charges 
and A.1.3.2 En-route Charges). 
 
A.1.1 Fuel and Oil – the cost of fuel and oil escalates in case of British Airways' 
Boeing 747 reaching close to over 30% of total operating cost whereas regarding the 
remaining flights it makes up between 25 and 27% of the total cost. It should be noted 
that since these numbers are relative, i.e. a percentage of the total costs, they do not nec-
essarily reflect to full extent the efficiency of the different types of aircraft, since the 
ratio is also influenced by other cost items. 
 
A.1.2 Flight crew – the cost of the flight crew is comparatively high in case of 
the Lufthansa-PrivatAir operation because the flight crew expenses decrease less than 
proportionally with the decreasing size of the plane. This information can be confirmed 
by the database of pilot's salaries as cited on the portal "Airline Pilot Central" (Airline 
Pilot Central 2006). The difference between a salary of a Boeing 737 pilot and a Boeing 
747 pilot is only about 25%. Regardless of the size of the plane, today, the majority of 
common types are flown by two pilots, so the fixed cost of pilots' expenses has a higher 
impact in smaller planes. Whereas the flight crew cost contributes to almost 10% of the 
total operating cost of the Lufthansa-PrivatAir operation, it is roughly 5% in case of 
MAXjet and Air France, 6.5% in case of Eos and bellow 3% in case of the British Air-
ways operation; the stark difference between British Airways and Air France can be 
attributed to the much higher level of additional payroll expenses in France. A minor, 
negligible portion of the variation is caused by the fact that the salaries are assumed to 
be different depending on the place of the incorporation of the respective airline. How-
ever, airlines are not limited to sourcing flight personnel at their home base and a situa-
tion with location independent salary inputs (as long as on at least one of the endpoints 
of the route is located in the same country as the operation it is being compared to) 
would be also fully valid. 
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A.1.3.1 Airport charges, computed as the sum of landing fees and airport pas-
senger charges, are usually directly proportional to the size of the aircraft (landing fee) 
and the number of passengers. Hence, flights with smaller aircraft and low density seat-
ing, i.e. single premium class flights, will be economically more favorable in terms of 
airport charges. While premium airlines' charges make up around 5% of the total operat-
ing costs, they make up around over 10% for the typical high density mixed class ser-
vice of the British Airways and Air France samples. On per passenger basis, the differ-
ence is not significant, with the landing and airport fees combined per passenger ac-
counting for about the same amount. 
 
A.1.3.2 Navigation charges represent 5.5% to 8.5% of the total operating cost on 
a transatlantic flight. They increase less than proportionally with the MTOW of the air-
craft and hence favor large aircraft. While they are only 5.6% for the British Airways 
flight and 7% for the Air France flight, they are over 8% for the premium class flights 
with smaller aircraft. 
 
A.1.4. Aircraft insurance is a function of the purchase price of the aircraft and is 
hence favorable in case older aircraft, since aircraft have been nominally becoming 
more expensive over time. The differences result from aircraft age and are irrelevant to 
the business model. 
 
A.2. Maintenance – there is no unexpected values regarding this item. Mainte-
nance expenditures are proportional to the age of the aircraft. While the maintenance 
costs make up between 7 and 10% of the total operating costs in case of the newer twin 
aircraft, the Airbus Corporate Jet, Airbus A330 and Boeing 757, the number is close to 
12% for the four-engine Boeing 747 (average age 12 years) and MAXjet's Boeing 767 
fleet aged over 20. Hence, it is safe to say that the maintenance expenditure is a function 
of the aircraft age and type (twin versus four engine) and has no significant implications 
on the premium airline business model. 
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A.3. Depreciation – the choice of aircraft regarding its age and the depreciation policy 
have a very significant impact on the economics of the operations. While the deprecia-
tion of the older Boeing 747 contributes by less than 10% to the total costs, it is in the 
area of 13-15% for the newer Airbus A319 and A330. However, it can be said that the 
gains in depreciation are offset by the lower operational efficiency in terms of mainte-
nance and fuel burn and possibly also the perception by the passengers which cannot be 
quantified. The long term impact on the bottom line will roughly be the same and the 
question of purchase of new versus older aircraft is rather that of available resources for 
capital expenditure or the willingness of banks or leasing companies to finance new 
aircraft, especially to new entrants. 
 
4.4.2 Indirect Operating Costs – Findings 
 Indirect operating costs consist of station and ground expenses, costs incurred by 
passenger services, advertising, ticketing and sales as well as administrative costs. They 
contribute by about 25% to the total operating cost. About half of this amount can be 
attributed to passenger service related expenses and the other half consists of sales, pro-
motion, station and administrative costs. In the following, the single cost items will be 
analyzed in detail. 
 
 B.1. Station / Ground Expenses – contribute by about 4% to the total cost of the 
flights in the sample. Since all of them are long-haul flights and the costs are consecu-
tively spread over long sectors, the differences among the samples in particular are not 
greater than 0.3% and are hence insignificant. 
 
 B.2.1 Cabin Crew Salaries and Expenses – constitute around 5% of the total cost 
of the flight in case of both the premium airlines and the mixed operations. As with the 
flight crew, there is minor, negligible personnel sourcing location bias with the salary 
and associated expenses being dependent on the home base country. 
 
 B.2.2 Other passenger service cost. While in the case of Lufthansa-PrivatAir and 
the Eos Airlines flight this item contributes around 5% to the total cost, this number 
reaches 6% in case of MAXjet. This can be attributed to the higher density seating on 
  52  
the MAXjet flight compared to Lufthansa-PrivatAir or Eos, while the lounge, meal and 
entertainment expenses per passenger are only slightly lower. In case of the mixed 
flights, this item represents less then 4% and can be explained by the cheaper meals and 
no lounge costs for economy passengers. 
 
 B.2.3 Passenger insurance adds about 0.7% to the total cost in case of the sample 
of mixed flights while being only 0.3% in case of the premium flights. Since the insur-
ance rate per passenger is the same regardless of the class of travel, the larger passenger 
numbers on the mixed flights are the reason for the higher contribution of the insurance 
to the total costs. 
 
 B.3.1 Ticketing, sales – as with most other items in the block of indirect operat-
ing costs which are variable or treated as variable costs – the contribution of the ticket-
ing and sales costs to the total costs is proportional to the passenger volume. Although 
the passenger volumes are substantially lower in case of the premium airline operation, 
the sales and ticketing cost accounts to around 2-3% of the total cost, which is roughly 
the same as the mixed flights. The reason is the assumption that provisions are higher 
on more expensive business class tickets. 
 
 B.3.2 Promotion, advertising – it should be noted upfront that the promotion and 
advertising cost estimates are based on assumptions of the author that are largely based 
on the analysis of profit and loss statements of airlines and their reported advertising 
spending as a percentage of the total cost. There is no reliable data on customer acquisi-
tion and retention costs available and these numbers are kept secret by airlines. Still, the 
author believes that the estimates and the underlying assumptions are reasonable enough 
to allow for a derivation of usable conclusions. Based on the customer acquisition / re-
tention cost of $15 per passenger per flight assumed for the established routes of British 
Airways and Air France, $30 for Lufthansa/PrivatAir (possibly even lower because of 
the established customer relationships and advertising channels), $40 for MAXjet and 
$50 for Eos Airlines (brand is still being built, no economies of scale in marketing), the 
advertising spending for traditional routes of British Airways and Air France will ac-
count for about 2.5% of the total cost. Due to the large number of passengers that need 
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to fill MAXjet's aircraft the customer acquisition and retention cost escalates to the level 
of almost 4% of the total cost while it is roughly 3.5% in case of Eos. On the other 
hand, Lufthansa-PrivatAir's service benefits from the low passenger numbers combined 
with high brand awareness and established distribution channels facilitating direct sales 
and minimizing the need for large scale advertising for Lufthansa's routes operated by 
PrivatAir. 
 
 B.4. Administration and other costs – Since all the flights in the sample are long-
haul flights, the impact of the administrative expenses will be relatively small. This is 
due to the circumstance that the fixed cost of administration is spread over a longer 
block than on medium and short-haul routes. In addition, these expenses' share of total 
cost decreases with the size of aircraft – the absolute cost increases with the size of air-
craft and number of passengers, but less then proportionally. This phenomenon puts the 
administrative costs of the flights of Air France, British Airways and Lufthansa to 
around 4% whereas Eos Airlines and Lufthansa-PrivatAir operations benefit from the 
lean structure of a start-up, holding the administration cost as low as 2%. 
 
4.4.3 Levers and Differentiators of the Premium Airline Model 
In the following, it will be attempted to identify the levers and cost drivers dif-
ferentiating the premium airline model from its traditional mixed class counterparts. 
The differences at the level of single cost items are summarized in Exhibit 15. 
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OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR Traditional Mixed 
Start-Up By Traditional Airline
A. Direct Operating Cost
A.1. Flight Operations
A.1.1. Fuel and Oil ? ? ?
A.1.2. Flight Crew Salaries and Expenses ? ? ?
A.1.3. Airport & En-route Charges
A.1.3.1. Airport Charges ? ? ?
A.1.3.2. En-route Charges (Navigation) ? ? ?
A.1.4. A/C Insurance ? ? ?
A.1.5. Rental / Lease (of A/C, Crew)
A.2. Maintenance ? ? ?
A.3. Depreciation ? ? ?
B. Indirect Operating Cost
B.1. Station / Ground Expenses ? ? ?
B.2. Passenger Services
B.2.1. Cabin Crew Salaries and Expenses ? ? ?
B.2.2. Other Passenger Service Costs ? ? ?
B.2.3. Passenger Insurance ? ? ?
B.3. Ticketing, Sales, Promotion
B.3.1. Ticketing, Sales ? ? ?
B.3.2. Promotion, Advertising ? ? ?
B.4. Administration and Other Costs ? ? ?
Legend Neutral Very high impact Higher impact Lower impact
? ? ? ?
Premium
COST  IMPACT  MATRIX
Impact of individual cost blocks on operating economics - comparison between premium and mixed model
 
Exhibit 15 – Cost impact matrix 
 
The tendency to use smaller aircraft for the premium class operation on long-
haul routes has its specific characteristics that are probably known to operators of Boe-
ing 7577 on thin transatlantic routes between the United States and cities in the United 
Kingdom other than London. From the direct operating cost perspective these flights 
suffer from a relatively high flight crew and navigation charges overhead. These two 
items are most significant since they are variable costs that are being induced by every 
additional block hour. In the flight operations cost block, fuel, aircraft insurance, main-
tenance and depreciation do not show a pattern that would be typical for the premium or 
differ significantly from that of a traditional mixed class operation.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The only narrow-body aircraft that is currently being used on a significant scale on long-haul sectors 
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In the block of indirect operating costs some patterns are linked to economies of 
scale and hence favor larger aircraft – this is the case of ground / station expenses, ad-
ministrative and other costs which are higher than those of their mixed counterparts if 
compared on the basis of aircraft capacity. 
A relevant difference can be found in the block of passenger service costs. For 
instance, the total cost of passenger services of MAXjet roughly equals the cost of pas-
senger service on the (longer sector and double passenger volume) Air France flight, 
being about $1.200 per block hour. This is understandable since service is the main dif-
ferentiator of the premium class operation and incurs corresponding expenses – more 
flight attendants are assigned per seat, (typically one per 10 passengers as opposed to 
one per 25-30 on a mixed flight). When compared on the basis of cabin area, one flight 
attendant is responsible for around 200 square feet on a premium flight and 300 square 
feet on a mixed flight.  
The costs of promotion and advertising show the need for differentiation be-
tween a premium operation that was started by an airline specifically set up for this pur-
pose and a premium operation initiated by traditional airlines. Traditional airlines such 
as Lufthansa (including their premium services) are able to leverage the costs of promo-
tion and advertising across tens or hundreds of flights a day. Start-up airlines are able to 
spread these costs only over a very small number of flights, while having to spend more 
on marketing because of the active process of brand building and capturing market 
share. 
Administrative costs also pose a different burden in respect to the type of airline. 
As long as the start-up airline truly practices lean management, they are lower as those 
of a traditional airline's mixed operation. A start-up airline has additional advantages of 
having lower personnel costs because of the lack of presence of labor unions and possi-
bly less costly frequent flyer programs. Since administrative costs are typically fixed 
costs rather independent of the aircraft size, they will be not much smaller in case of a 
traditional airline's premium operation, meaning a higher cost per unit in case of the 
premium operation, e.g. on a cabin area basis. 
A very important cost factor that is explicitly not included in the calculation due 
to its specificity related to the particular airport and the ownership and purchasing 
method is the cost of airport slots. The slots are very valuable in major hubs and their 
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cost is generally not related to the aircraft size or only to a small extent. The high cost of 
a slot is spread over very few passengers in case of the premium operation. However, 
the pricing of slots could become more dependent on the aircraft size with the issue be-
ing discussed more heavily with the advent of Very Large Aircraft (Air Safety Week 
2001). Especially traditional airlines which plan to launch a premium operation will 
consider not doing this from a major hub, since the expensive slots are likely to be bet-
ter utilized by bigger aircraft in absolute profit terms. 
 
4.4.4 KPI Analysis 
The analysis of the cost blocks is valuable in terms of putting light on the indi-
vidual cost items that differentiate the two business models. Nevertheless, in order to 
gain a better understanding from a broader perspective it is beneficial to analyze a num-
ber of high level KPIs. In the following, a number of standard industry KPIs such as 
CASM will be compared among the business models as well as a number of selective 
proprietary KPIs devised by the author. A summary can be seen in Exhibit 16. 
 
O U T P U T 
OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR / USD LH-PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752MaxJet - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
@ 70% Load Factor* DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
All Business Class Mixed Class
 
Total Cost / Sector 46,738 51,394 70,147 94,856 147,898
Total Cost / Sector / PAX 1,391 1,530 982 610 609
CASM ($c) - Cost per available seat mile 26.0 30.9 19.9 11.8 12.2
CASM excl. Fuel ($c) - Cost per available seat mile 19.4 22.4 14.7 8.9 8.2
Total Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 7.1 5.8 5.9 5.3 5.3
Direct Ops Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 5.5 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.1
Flight Ops Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 4.0 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.0
Indirect Ops Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.2
Total Cost / Block h / MTOW (ton) 77.9 66.5 56.2 55.6 55.1
Cost - PAX Service / Block h / PAX 12.5 15.6 11.5 5.8 5.3
Cost - PAX Service / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 0.73 0.60 0.70 0.53 0.48
Cost - PAX Service / Block h / MTOW (ton) 8.0 6.9 6.7 5.6 5.0
Cost - ticketing & sales / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.13
Area (sq.ft) per PAX 17.2 26.0 16.3 10.9 11.2
CASM / Cabin area (sq.ft) 1.51 1.19 1.22 1.08 1.09  
Exhibit 16  - Selective KPIs 
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4.4.4.1 Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM) 
Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM) gives information about the cost per 
available seat per traveled mile. Information on CASM of major airlines is widely 
available8. The additional value of investigating the premium airline model CASM 
characteristics lies in the fact that the findings can also be used as good indicators for 
the business class of travel on mixed flights, which are rarely published. Both CASM 
and non-fuel CASM were computed, the latter in order to eliminate the jet fuel price 
volatility from the benchmarks (Exhibit 17).  
Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM)
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$c
 
Exhibit 17 – Cost per Available Seat Mile 
  
The British Airways and the Air France flights show similar CASM numbers of 
12.2 and 11.8 $cent and a non-fuel CASM of 8.2 and 8.9. The non-fuel CASM repre-
sents about 75% of the full CASM in case of the A330-200 based Air France operation 
and 68% in case of the Boeing 747-400 British Airways operation. 
CASM of the premium model reflects the higher cost impact of multiple cost 
blocks resulting from the nature of the service. CASM of the Lufthansa-PrivatAir, 
                                                 
8 CASM can be found in annual reports of numerous airlines or their SEC filings 
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MAXjet and Eos operations is 26, 19.9 and 30.9 $cents and the non fuel CASM is 19.4, 
14.7 and 22.4 $cents. Similarly as in the case of the Air France operation the non-fuel 
CASM represents about 75% of the total CASM. While the aircraft used for the pre-
mium operation are similar in terms of construction type, they are smaller in size and 
hence generally have higher specific fuel consumption (Exhibit 18), which is especially 
true for the narrow-body Airbus A319LR and Boeing 757. Despite this fact, the ratio of 
around 75% is identical – this can be explained by higher costs in cost blocks other than 
fuel in case of the premium airlines. 
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Exhibit 18 – Fuel Efficiency 
 
Among the types of premium models represented by the PrivatAir, MAXjet and 
Eos models, the differences are clearly reflected in the CASM values. Simplified, 
CASM is basically a function of average cabin space per passenger and the level of ser-
vice. Hence, a ratio of CASM and cabin area per passenger provides a good picture 
about the cost effectiveness of the operation and is further used as a supplemental KPI 
(Exhibit 16). This pattern is also present in case of all three airlines, where Eos – the 
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airline with the most costly service and also most cabin space per passenger (26 square 
feet9) among the three – has the highest CASM. 
PrivatAir offers roughly 17 square of feet of cabin space per passenger, putting 
its CASM to cabin area ratio to 1.5 $cents per square feet, as opposed to 1.2 $cent in 
case of Eos and MAXjet and 1.1 $cent in case of the traditional airlines. This can be 
explained by the slightly worse specific consumption compared to the larger Boeing 
757 or Boeing 767, higher employee costs (because of the assumed employee sourcing 
exclusively in Switzerland as opposed to the US) and the use of relatively new aircraft 
with calculatory depreciation rates not much lower than those of the bigger Boeing 757 
and 767. Passenger services costs are lower than those of Eos but are not enough to off-
set the higher impact of the direct operating cost blocks mentioned above. 
 
4.4.4.2 Capacity-related KPIs 
In order to indirectly assess the total cost burden in relation to capital employed 
(this approach is based on the assumption that aircraft size and capacity are generally 
relatively accurate predictors of its cost) capacity-related KPIs have been devised. These 
can be most conveniently based on two indicators – the passenger cabin floor area 
(measured in square feet) and the Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW). The cost per 
cabin area comparison can be seen in Exhibit 19; the total cost has been split into direct 
and indirect operating costs in order to better illustrate the determining factors.  
 
                                                 
9 Please note that this value can vary depending on whether solely the passenger footprint is considered or 
the floor space of the entire cabin is simply divided by the number of seats, and whether various common 
facilities are included or not. All approaches are valid and in most cases an equally credible comparison 
will be possible using both methods. 
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Operating Cost / Cabin Floor Area / Block Hour
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Exhibit 19 – Operating cost measured on cabin floor area 
 
The total cost per block hour per square feet of cabin space is roughly 7 $cent in 
case of Lufthansa-PrivatAir, 6 $cent in case of Eos and MAXjet and 5.3 $cent in case of 
the mixed operation of British Airways and Air France. The difference represents about 
25% higher costs in case of the Lufthansa-PrivatAir flight as compared to the mixed 
flight, which can be attributed to the factors described previously in the section on 
CASM. However, the difference is only 10% when the cost per square feet of MAXjet 
and Eos are compared to the mixed flights in the sample (Exhibit 20). This finding indi-
cates that it is possible to provide premium service for a total cost not substantially 
higher than that of a traditional mixed class service. 
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CASM vs. Total Cost / Block h / Cabin Area
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Exhibit 20 – CASM versus Total cost / Block hour / Cabin area 
 
If the total cost is split into direct and indirect costs, one can observe that the 
cost benefit favoring the mixed operation can be surprisingly attributed to the direct 
rather than indirect operating costs. Indirect operating cost is in the range between 1.2 
and 1.6 $cent per square feet per block hour, which implies that in case of a significant 
difference in the total operating costs (Lufthansa-PrivatAir), the main contributing fac-
tor are the economies of scale (especially in the area of flight operations) rather than the 
level of service. When the main cost block of the indirect operating cost, the cost of 
passenger services, is compared on a per-passenger basis, the difference between the 
premium and mixed operation can be as high as 290% (Exhibit 21). However, when the 
costs related to cabin area are compared, the difference between the same two flights is 
only 25% or around 12 $cent per square feet per hour, indicating that the impact of pas-
senger service is marginal compared to the impact of economies of scale within the 
block of direct operating costs. 
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Exhibit 21 – Passenger service cost 
 
Comparison of costs based on MTOW yields similar results. While Lufthansa-
PrivatAir's total cost is close to 80 $cents per ton per block hour, those of MAXjet, Brit-
ish Airways and Air France are on the same level of around 55 $cent per ton. Surely, 
this can be partly attributed to the higher specific weight of MAXjet's Boeing 767, the 
only wide-body aircraft among the types used for the premium airline operation. Never-
theless, the finding supports the former thesis that the total costs can be held on a simi-
lar level as in case of the mixed operation. 
 
4.4.4.3 Total Cost per Sector per Passenger 
Total Cost per Sector per Passenger is a high level KPI that can be primarily 
used as an indication for pricing purposes. From the revenue perspective, it can be seen 
as the mean revenue per passenger from which the operating margin has been sub-
tracted. It is computed as the total cost per sector divided by the number of passengers 
at a target load factor. The computed cost per passenger per sector is roughly $1,390 in 
case of the Lufthansa-PrivatAir operation and $1,530 in case of Eos (Exhibit 22). 
MAXjet's use of larger capacity aircraft combined with lower cost of service when 
  63  
compared to Eos and Lufthansa/PrivatAir lowers the number to $980, while the tradi-
tional mixed class services by Air France and British Airways come to around $610. As 
mentioned above, the cost per sector value can be used as a basis for establishing the 
mean ticket price by adding an appropriate margin on top of the costs – however, this is 
only applicable for the single class concept. 
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Exhibit 22 – Total cost per sector 
 
4.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the sensitivity towards external influences and possible differ-
ences between the premium airline model and to the traditional mixed class operation, a 
sensitivity analysis has been concluded. At first, the average fare for each flight was set 
to a specific level to reach an equal operating margin of 10% (Exhibit 23). Subse-
quently, the fares were held constant and the impact of the variation in selected input 
variables on the operating margin was tested. The resulting operating margins were re-
corded and are displayed in Table 8. 
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O U T P U T 
OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR / USD LH-PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752MaxJet - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
@ 70% Load Factor* DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
All Business Class Mixed Class
 
40 AVG Ticket Price (One Way) Economy 460.0 375.0
41 AVG Ticket Price (One Way) Business 1,545.0 1,700.0 1,092.0 1,670.0 2,160.0
42 AVG Ticket Price (One Way) First 4,050.0  
Exhibit 23 – Average fares in $ at 10% operating margin (the distribution between economy, busi-
ness and first class in case of the mixed flights is arbitrary) 
 
 
LH-PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752 MaxJet - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
Fuel 25% up 4.3% 3.8% 4.1% 4.4% 2.7%
Fuel 40% up 0.9% 0.1% 0.6% 1.0% -1.7%
Fuel 25% down 15.6% 16.2% 15.9% 15.6% 17.2%
A/C Insurance Premium 2% up 5.6% 5.8% 6.7% 6.2% 7.1%
Pilots' salary 25% up 7.7% 8.5% 8.9% 8.7% 9.4%
Business Class LF 10% down 
(from 70% to 60%) -3.1% -3.0% -2.2% 4.5% 5.6%
Business Class LF 10% up 
(from 70% to 80%) 19.8% 19.8% 19.2% 14.8% 13.9%
All LFs 10% down (Biz+Econ 
70%->60%, First 50%->40%) -3.1% -3.0% -2.2% -2.4% -3.5%
All LFs 10% up (Biz+Econ 70%-
>80%, First 50%->60%) 19.8% 19.8% 19.2% 19.2% 19.9%
Airport & Landing Charges 
20% up 9.0% 9.1% 8.7% 8.0% 8.0%
Ticketing and Sales Expenses 
50% down 10.9% 10.9% 11.4% 11.1% 11.1%
Impact of Selected Input Factor Variations on Operating Margin
All Business Class Mixed
 
Table 8 – Sensitivity Analysis (the displayed values are the respective operating margins) 
 
The outcome of the tests supports the findings of the previous analysis of operat-
ing economics. The impact of variation in fuel price and insurance premium is a func-
tion of aircraft type and age rather than the business model. A rise in flight crew salary 
has the most significant detrimental effects in case of Lufthansa-PrivatAir, followed by 
Eos, Air France and MAXjet. The profitability of the British Airways flight is almost 
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unaffected. It should be noted that the margin reduction in case of Eos and MAXjet can 
be attributed to the business model itself, while it is the result of high additional payroll 
expenses (34% over the US level) in case of the Air France operation. Variations in load 
factors produce predictable results. While an isolated 10% load factor drop in the busi-
ness class compartment leads to a negative profit margin for the business class-only 
flights, it remains positive in case of the mixed operations. A 10% rise in business class 
load factor produces substantially higher margins for the premium model than for the 
traditional operation. Reduction or rise in load factors in all compartments leads to simi-
lar levels of margin decline or growth regardless of the type of business model. As 
stated in the previous chapter, airport and landing charges have a higher impact on the 
mixed operation because of calculation of landing fees that is proportional to MTOW 
and higher passenger density. No strong difference could be established in case of a 
decline in ticketing and sales. 
 
4.5 Summary of the Findings, Implications 
In the chapter 2.5 Market Entry Barriers economies of scale and high marketing 
costs were identified as the main barriers for the establishment of a new airline service. 
The actual analysis of the operating economics on the sample of five selected flights 
supports these findings and extends their relevance to the premium airline business 
model. 
The original assumptions about economies of scale by Bailey et al. (1985), 
Caves et al. (1984) and Kirby (1986) see the use of large aircraft as the way to utilize 
them. The newcomer is restricted from benefiting from economies of scale because the 
airline initially cannot generate enough demand or finds it difficult to obtain finance for 
large aircraft (Kummer 2001). While the impossibility of utilization of economies of 
scale is common to the premium airline model and the newcomers treated in the previ-
ous research, the reasons for this fact are not the same and the difference is inherent to 
the nature of the premium model. The premium operation does struggle with the prob-
lem of a demand volume that does not allow for the use of large aircraft; however, this 
can be attributed to the natural phenomenon that there are fewest routes with more than 
50-100 business passengers traveling at the same time. Thus, the model is limited to the 
use of smaller aircraft per se and not because of the lack of demand in the initial phase. 
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The contribution of this analysis is the identification of the individual cost 
blocks that are primarily responsible for the lack of economies of scale – flight crew 
salaries, navigation charges on the direct operating costs side and marketing expenditure 
and cost of slots (treated outside of the model) in the block of indirect operating costs. 
Surprisingly, passenger service is not a very significant cost driver, it contributes only 
between 10 to 12% to the total operating costs in the premium model, as opposed to 
slightly under 10% in case of the mixed operation. Nevertheless, the cost item in abso-
lute numbers is not more then 25% higher compared to the mixed class operation, meas-
ured on the basis of cabin area. 
While the higher impact of flight crew, navigation and slot expenses is common 
to both the start-up operation and the premium model launched by an established air-
line, the implications differ in terms of marketing costs, which are much higher in case 
of a start-up airline. 
Contrary to the popular perception that because larger airliners have better spe-
cific fuel burn (a factor contributing to economies of scale) and small aircraft operating 
on short-haul routes should thus be in disadvantage, no significant impact could be es-
tablished. Big networks carriers use very mixed fleets in terms of types and age on their 
long-haul routes with a corresponding variation in specific fuel consumption. Hence, 
premium airline operation with a unified fleet of relatively modern smaller aircraft 
should have no disadvantage regarding fuel efficiency. Furthermore, it can be assumed 
that a network carrier with a large fleet will due to complexity of associated operations 
and infrastructure find it more difficult to quickly replace its fleet with newer, more 
efficient aircraft than a small-scale, premium operation. 
To sum up, a premium operator does not have to fear significantly higher total 
cost of operation than the traditional mixed carrier, but needs to address the deficiencies 
in the identified cost blocks in order to be as competitive as possible. While an airline 
has virtually no influence over navigation charges, it has some room to control the costs 
of flight crew through the choice of employee sourcing location and avoidance of labor 
unions. Expenses can also be avoided by selecting a cheaper airport as a base, as long as 
alternatives exist – as in case of Eos and MAXjet which operate from Stansted rather 
than other costly London airports. However, disadvantages, such as limited potential for 
interlining, which were discussed in chapter 3.3 Provision of Better Value for the Trav-
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eller – "Verkehrswertigkeit", need to be kept in mind. Start-up airlines will also have the 
advantage of being able to replicate the lean management structure of low-cost carriers 
and this opportunity should not be missed. Nevertheless, the biggest threat, especially to 
a start-up premium airline, is the potentially inefficient use of marketing, with market-
ing expenses representing non-recoverable sunk costs. Very careful customer segmenta-
tion and appropriate choice of promotion media has to ensure that the customer acquisi-
tion costs will be kept at minimum while reaching the targeted mass. Furthermore, even 
with the right medium chosen, the line between a dollar spent too much or too little is 
very thin. Hence, marketing might be the critical success factor for a premium airline 
start-up. 
An aspect that has not explicitly been accounted for in the calculations is the im-
pact of keeping back-up aircraft, back-up crew and spare parts. While the associated 
expenses are close to marginal in case of large network carriers, they currently have a 
significant impact on the start-up airlines. The arbitrary exclusion of this element has 
been chosen based on the premises that the young airlines have been gradually expand-
ing their services by adding new routes (MAXjet), increasing frequencies (both) and 
expanding their fleet, thus spreading the fixed cost of these items over a continuously 
growing base of operations. Due to the dynamic development, a concrete number might 
loose its validity within a short period of time and the inclusion of this factor was there-
fore abandoned. Currently, Eos operates two aircraft and keeps one on stand-by, which, 
including back-up crew and estimated spare parts cost, has an impact of additional 9% 
on top of the computed total cost per block hour. In case of MAXjet with its fleet con-
sisting of six aircraft and an average fleet age of above 20 years, this number is lower, 
roughly 5%. If the expansion continues, it can be anticipated that these fixed costs will 
become similarly marginal as in case of large network carriers. 
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5. Conclusion 
Premium airline services have not existed long enough to prove their long-term 
viability. However, they came into existence in a period where the airline industry, 
slowly recovering from the shock of 9/11, was hit by record oil prices. This has put 
pressure on margins and driven fares up in case of all market players. If premium airline 
offerings are able to be attractive to the customer while creating profitable business for 
the owner in this period of time, they are likely to succeed in the long run. So far, there 
have been good news – the service of Lufthansa and PrivatAir showed load factors 
around 60% to 75% on the all business class routes in 2005 (source undisclosed). Simi-
larly, Eos Airlines and MAXjet have reported load factors in the 70%-s in the high sea-
son of 2006 (Eos 2006b, MAXjet 2006c). It cannot be agreed with the popular opinion 
that the model has existed and failed previously, referring to Regent Air, MGM Grand 
Air and Concorde – these services were substantially different in terms of their time 
period background, cost structure and the service itself. Hence, no predictions for the 
current premium airline model can be drawn from their failure. 
 
This paper has examined the business model from strategic and operational as-
pects. In both cases, there seems to be no significant obstacle that would make the 
launch and operation less viable than in case of established forms of scheduled services. 
Two business model approaches which depend on the type of market have been identi-
fied: the pull motivated strategy aimed at selective target groups coming from specific 
industry clusters; this approach is common for the model pioneered by Lufthansa in 
cooperation with PrivatAir and further adopted by Swiss and KLM. The other way is a 
push-motivated entry into a competitive route aimed at a niche market, the value driven 
business traveler. This model has been introduced by Eos Airlines and MAXjet Air-
ways. The analysis in this paper has proven that these services have an inherent value 
benefit for the target group. It is the convenience and comfort of the point-to-point sin-
gle business class service in case of the Lufthansa-PrivatAir model and the high get/give 
ratio in case of the Eos/MAXjet model. The positive responsiveness to the value posi-
tioning can be predicted by the results of several price sensitivity studies. 
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It has been established that short-haul routes are not viable because of reduced 
willingness of companies to pay for business class on short business trips, resulting in 
quality downgrades, low load factors and price erosion. The ultra-long-haul market, i.e. 
roughly over 10.000 km, is also not an alternative either because the thin demand is 
already being sufficiently served by the network carriers. Moreover, the narrow-body 
aircraft that would be suitable for the demand capacity-wise have insufficient range. 
The viable alternatives are the traditional long-haul markets such as the transatlantic, 
transpacific and possibly also the medium-haul market, for instance Europe-Middle 
East. However, this option will be likely open only to the Middle-eastern airlines which 
posses a competitive advantage in fuel and employee expenses and strong government 
support. Generally, good predictors of potential are quality upgrades in existing busi-
ness class services in a specific market. In case of north-south alignment of the route 
possible effects of reduced time zone-shift (as opposed to east-west routes) on aircraft 
utilization and its impact on economics would further need to be examined. Globally, 
emerging markets such as Russia, Central Asia - Middle East and China, especially 
routes that connect industry clusters could be the next to see a launch of a single class 
premium service. There are still possibilities open in the Europe-US market, cities such 
as Hamburg, Berlin, Stuttgart, Marseille and industrial British conurbations being can-
didates for a business class connection with their US-counterparts. However, existing 
airlines which consider launching a single class premium operation should be expecting 
a certain degree of cannibalization of their hub feeds. 
 
The decision to enter a certain market has a determining impact on the choice of 
aircraft. The viability of long- and medium-haul routes for the premium airline model 
reduces the aircraft choice to the extended range versions of narrow-body airliners of 
the Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 families for the thin business routes. They feature fa-
vorable operating economics and thanks to different available fuselage lengths they also 
offer flexibility within the fleet in terms of capacity, in case new routes with different 
characteristics are opened. On the aftermarket, Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 families are 
attractive especially to the value-positioned new entrants. 
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The competition to the premium airline model does not come in the form of pri-
vate jet charters or fractional jet ownership, this form of travel still plays in the cost 
league above first class. It is the sophisticated connectivity of the network carriers offer-
ing high frequencies, redundancy, code-sharing, interlining and added benefits of exten-
sive frequent flyer programs from the customer's point of view, and economies of scale 
combined with enormous market presence and goodwill from the operator's standpoint. 
Due to the lack of network capabilities resulting from the scale and choice of point air-
ports, premium airline operations have to rely on local demand. However, the premium 
airline model is able to offset these shortcomings by the convenience of less congested 
airports, lean operations and provision of a certain value demanded by the customer. It 
is not clear whether value driven business class passengers will accept a limited fre-
quent flyer program in turn for discounted fares as it happened with no-frills airlines. 
Currently it seems to be an important influencing factor in their travel decision making. 
However, business owners or managers whose compensation is based on the perform-
ance of their profit centers might be willing to trade in for the fare savings. On the other 
hand, an innovative frequent flyer program as offered by Eos Airlines and MAXjet can 
serve to overcome the lack of networking effects in the customer loyalty area. 
In the launch period, the vital point is the efficient establishment of market pres-
ence and goodwill. The target group has to be reached and the associated expenses are 
non-recoverable, sunk costs. The balance between a dollar spent too much or too little is 
fragile and promotion channels have to be chosen very carefully in terms of reaching 
and persuading the critical mass of the target group to try the first flight; all this with 
very limited resources compared to competing network carriers. Apart from advertising, 
the earliest integration in Global Distribution Systems is necessary in order to leverage 
the offering through a powerful distribution channel with reach to business travel 
agents. Possible GDS-rating of a portion of the seats as premium economy should be 
examined – there is potential to capture the lower end of the market where company 
policy restrictions are based on class of travel rather than price. This option could be 
interesting especially for MAXjet and Silverjet. In the long term, replicating the lean 
management structure of low-cost carriers is vital to the success of airlines that have 
built their positioning around provisioning of superb value. Climbing costs would trans-
late into rising prices with inevitably diminishing value or shrinking profit margin. The 
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latter could just recently be seen on the example of JetBlue, writing their first red num-
bers (Forbes 2006). 
 
The analysis of operating economics on the basis of five sample flights yielded 
results indicating that there is no stark difference in the overall cost structure between 
the single class premium and traditional airline operation. In the cost block of flight 
operations, flight crew (pilots) expenses and navigation charges demonstrate economies 
of scale; their impact can be as high as 10% in case of Lufthansa-PrivatAir while being 
fewer than 3% of total cost in case of mixed flight on British Airways' Boeing 747. The 
new entrants have some room to compensate the high impact of flight crew salaries 
thanks to the lack of labor unions and by sourcing pilots in countries with lower addi-
tional payroll expenses. The flight crew cost handicap is further offset by the lower air-
port charges that are directly proportional to aircraft size and passenger numbers, and 
tend to be substantially lower at point airports. Despite the expectation of higher impact 
of higher specific fuel burn of smaller aircraft, this effect is marginal. Network carriers 
can have even more disadvantageous expense situation as regards fuel and maintenance 
due to their mixed fleets in terms of age and types. 
In the area of indirect operating costs, the cost of passenger service could sur-
prisingly not be identified as cost driver. The cost of passenger service measured as 
share of total cost and on the basis of cabin floor area is not significantly higher than 
that of a traditional mixed operation. Start-up airlines will have higher expenses on 
promotion due to the need for extensive marketing activities during the launch period 
and beyond because they will (at least partly) use the same channels as the much larger 
competing network carrier. However, the administrative overhead can be kept down 
thanks to the replication of low-cost airlines' lean management structure. 
 
Last but not least, every possibility that makes the service more valuable or 
costly to imitate for a competitor needs to be exploited. Unique seating configuration as 
seen in case of Eos, syndication of travel miles of multiple passengers in case of 
MAXjet, or Lufthansa's offering of private jet transport on the continental leg of the trip 
could be named as examples of competitive advantage sources. Even the start-up air-
lines can innovatively built a competitive edge in the area of economies of scale. Coop-
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eration with non-competing operators such as logistics companies in sharing the costs of 
stand-by spare parts for identical aircraft (e.g. Eos and DHL's Boeing 757s) could be 
thinkable. As long as the airlines manage to preserve their competitive advantages and 
bring the promised value to the customer, there appears to be no reason why the pre-
mium airline model should be more prone to failure than its traditional counterpart. 
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Appendix – Model Data 
 
O U T P U T 
OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR / USD LH-PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752MaxJet - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
@ 70% Load Factor* DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
A. Direct Operating Cost 4,546 5,690 7,388 9,807 16,236
A.1. Flight Operations 3,299 3,976 5,106 6,986 11,707
A.1.1. Fuel and Oil 1,478 1,995 2,586 3,172 6,721
A.1.2. Flight Crew Salaries and Expenses 588 481 481 724 544
A.1.3. Airport & En-route Charges 810 993 1,499 2,279 3,427
A.1.3.1. Airport Charges 312 372 710 1,376 2,269
A.1.3.2. En-route Charges (Navigation) 498 621 789 903 1,158
A.1.4. A/C Insurance 423 507 541 811 1,014
A.1.5. Rental / Lease (of A/C, Crew) 0 0 0 0 0
A.2. Maintenance 400 700 1,200 1,200 2,500
A.3. Depreciation A/C 847 1,014 1,082 1,621 2,029
B. Indirect Operating Cost 1334 1540 2480 2987 4570
B.1. Station / Ground Expenses 226 274 394 540 823
B.2. Passenger Services 602 747 1172 1279 1878
B.2.1. Cabin Crew Salaries and Expenses 288 398 530 710 933
B.2.2. Other Passenger Service Costs 296 331 603 484 812
B.2.3. Passenger Insurance 18 18 39 85 132
B.3. Ticketing, Sales, Promotion 254 378 703 629 1025
B.3.1. Ticketing, Sales 127 142 301 314 513
B.3.2. Promotion, Advertising 127 236 402 314 513
B.4. Administration and Other Costs 252 141 211 540 844
TOTAL Operating Cost / Block Hour 5,880 7,230 9,868 12,794 20,805
*) Load Factor in BA First Class assumed 50%
All Business Class Mixed Class
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O U T P U T 
OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR / USD LH-PrivA. - A319LRMaxJet - B762ER Eos - B752 BA - B744 AF - A332
@ 70% Load Factor* DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK LHR - JFK CDG - JFK
Total Cost / Sector 46,738 51,394 70,147 94,856 147,898
Total Cost / Sector / PAX 1,391 1,530 982 610 609
CASM ($c) - Cost per available seat mile 26.0 30.9 19.9 11.8 12.2
CASM excl. Fuel ($c) - Cost per available seat mile 19.4 22.4 14.7 8.9 8.2
Total Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 7.1 5.8 5.9 5.3 5.3
Direct Ops Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 5.5 4.6 4.4 4.1 4.1
Flight Ops Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 4.0 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.0
Indirect Ops Cost / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.2
Total Cost / Block h / MTOW (ton) 77.9 66.5 56.2 55.6 55.1
Cost - PAX Service / Block h / PAX 12.5 15.6 11.5 5.8 5.3
Cost - PAX Service / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 0.73 0.60 0.70 0.53 0.48
Cost - PAX Service / Block h / MTOW (ton) 8.0 6.9 6.7 5.6 5.0
Cost - ticketing & sales / Block h / Cabin area (sq.ft) 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.13
Area (sq.ft) per PAX 17.2 26.0 16.3 10.9 11.2
CASM / Cabin area (sq.ft) 1.51 1.19 1.22 1.08 1.09
Direct Operating Cost / Block Hour excl. Fuel 3,068 3,695 4,802 6,635 9,514
Direct Operating Cost / Block Hour excl. Fuel & Deprec 2,222 2,681 3,720 5,014 7,486
Specific consumption (Gal/ton MTOW) 10.9 10.2 8.2 7.7 9.9
Specific consumption (Gal/SqFeet) 0.97 0.89 0.86 0.73 0.95
Average fare round-trip incl. 10% Margin 3,060 3,365 2,161 1,343 1,340
Cabin area / MTOW 11.3 11.5 9.5 10.5 10.4
Average fare  one-way incl. 10% Margin 1,530 1,683 1,081 671 670
Est. Revenue 51,912 57,120 77,969 105,364 164,294
RASM ($c) - Revenue per available seat mile 28.84 34.39 22.09 13.11 13.53
Operating Profit 5,174 5,726 7,822 10,508 16,395
Operating Margin 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%
EBITDA 6,020 6,740 8,904 12,129 18,424
EBITDA Margin 12% 12% 11% 12% 11%
K
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PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752MaxJet - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
All Business Class Mixed Class
I N P U T
1 A/C Price 70,000,000.0 75,000,000.0 80,000,000.0 125,000,000.0 150,000,000.0
2 No of Years for Depreciation 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
3 Residual Value 7,000,000.0 7,500,000.0 8,000,000.0 12,500,000.0 15,000,000.0
4 Or A/C Rental per Block Hour (Instead of 1-3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 A/C Insurance per Block Hour 423.4 507.2 541.1 810.5 1,014.5
6 AC Fuel Burn Gallons per Hour 820.9 1,108.2 1,436.6 1,762.0 3,734.0
7 Maintenance per Block Hour 400.0 700.0 1,200.0 1,200.0 2,500.0
8 AVG crusing Speed mach 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
9 A/C Cabin Floor Space Economy (Sq. Ft.) 1,498.1 2,240.0
10 A/C Cabin Floor Space Business (Sq. Ft.) 823.2 1,248.0 1,667.0 921.9 980.0
11 A/C Cabin Floor Space First (Sq. Ft.) 700.0
12 Captain's Yearly Salary 180,000.0 160,000.0 160,000.0 180,000.0 180,000.0
13 FO Yearly Salary 126,000.0 112,000.0 112,000.0 126,000.0 126,000.0
14 Cabin Crew Yearly Salary (1 Person) 40,000.0 40,000.0 40,000.0 40,000.0 40,000.0
15 Additional Payrol Expenses Factor (LNK) 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.6
16 Number of Cabin Crew 4.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 14.0
17 No of Seats Economy 182.0 299.0
18 No of Seats Business 48.0 48.0 102.0 40.0 38.0
19 No of Seats First 14.0
20 Load Factor Economy 0.7 0.7
21 Load Factor Business 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
22 Load Factor First 0.5
23 Jet Fuel Price $ per Gallon 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
24 Groud / Station expenses - i.e. Handling, De-Icing ( 1,800.0 1,950.0 2,800.0 4,000.0 5,850.0
25 AVG Navigation Charge per Block Hour 497.7 621.3 789.1 903.4 1,157.8
26 Landing Fee 955.1 1,113.0 1,795.4 2,352.9 3,864.9
27 Terminal Fee per Passenger (origin) 15.0 15.0 15.0 20.0 20.0
28 Terminal Fee per Passenger (destination) 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5 30.5
29 Lounge Cost per Passenger Economy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
30 Lounge Cost per Passenger Business 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0
31 Lounge Cost per Passenger First 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.0
32 Passenger Meal Cost & Entertainment Economy 15.0 15.0
33 Passenger Meal Cost & Entertainment Business 50.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 50.0
34 Passenger Meal Cost & Entertainment First 80.0
35 Passenger Insurance 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.1 3.9
36 Ticketing, Sales per Passenger 30.0 30.0 30.0 15.0 15.0
37 Promotion/Advertizing per Passenger 30.0 50.0 40.0 15.0 15.0
38 Administration and other costs (per flight) 2,000.0 1,000.0 1,500.0 4,000.0 6,000.0
39 Sector Length (miles) 3,750.0 3,460.0 3,460.0 3,620.0 3,460.0
40 AVG Ticket Price (One Way) Economy 460.0 375.0
41 AVG Ticket Price (One Way) Business 1,545.0 1,700.0 1,092.0 1,670.0 2,160.0
42 AVG Ticket Price (One Way) First 4,050.0
44 AVG Ticket Price 1,545.0 1,700.0 1,092.0 678.0 714.8
45 Total operating time (h) 7.9 7.1 7.1 7.4 7.1
No of seats Total 48.0 48.0 102.0 222.0 351.0
Sq. Feet total 850.0 1,248.0 1,667.0 2,420.0 3,920.0
MTOW 75.5 108.8 175.5 230.0 377.8
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O U T P U T OUTPUT - Operating Cost as % of Total Cost
OPERATING COST PER BLOCK HOUR / USD LH-PrivA. - A319LR Eos - B752Jet - B762ER AF - A332 BA - B744
@ 70% Load Factor* DUS-EWR STN-JFK STN-JFK CDG - JFK LHR - JFK
A. Direct Operating Cost 77% 79% 75% 77% 78%
A.1. Flight Operations 56% 55% 52% 55% 56%
A.1.1. Fuel and Oil 25% 28% 26% 25% 32%
A.1.2. Flight Crew Salaries and Expenses 10% 7% 5% 6% 3%
A.1.3. Airport & En-route Charges 14% 14% 15% 18% 16%
A.1.3.1. Airport Charges 5% 5% 7% 11% 11%
A.1.3.2. En-route Charges (Navigation) 8% 9% 8% 7% 6%
A.1.4. A/C Insurance 7% 7% 5% 6% 5%
A.1.5. Rental / Lease (of A/C, Crew) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
A.2. Maintenance 7% 10% 12% 9% 12%
A.3. Depreciation A/C 14% 14% 11% 13% 10%
B. Indirect Operating Cost 23% 21% 25% 23% 22%
B.1. Station / Ground Expenses 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
B.2. Passenger Services 10% 10% 12% 10% 9%
B.2.1. Cabin Crew Salaries and Expenses 5% 5% 5% 6% 4%
B.2.2. Other Passenger Service Costs 5% 5% 6% 4% 4%
B.2.3. Passenger Insurance 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
B.3. Ticketing, Sales, Promotion 4% 5% 7% 5% 5%
B.3.1. Ticketing, Sales 2% 2% 3% 2% 2%
B.3.2. Promotion, Advertising 2% 3% 4% 2% 2%
B.4. Administration and Other Costs 4% 2% 2% 4% 4%
TOTAL Operating Cost / Block Hour 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
All Business Class Mixed Class
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